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1SEIzINg ThE OppORTUNITy
                                                      I N T R O D U C T I O N                                                      
Over the past two decades, a tremendous volume of new knowledge has emerged about 
causes of adolescent delinquency and the effective responses. Through research and policy 
experimentation, scholars and practitioners have proven that several new approaches 
significantly improve outcomes for youth who become involved in delinquency, thereby 
enhancing public safety and saving taxpayers’ money. These advances provide public 
officials with unprecedented opportunities to redesign their juvenile justice systems for the 
benefit of youth, families and communities.
Unfortunately, most states and localities have been slow to recognize and act on this new information, slow to 
seize these opportunities for constructive change. Progress has been uneven. 
Perhaps more than any other state, Connecticut has absorbed the growing body of knowledge about youth 
development, adolescent brain research and delinquency, adopted its lessons, and used the information to 
fundamentally re-invent its approach to juvenile justice. As a result, Connecticut’s system today is far and  
away more successful, more humane, and more cost-effective than it was 10 or 20 years ago. 
This report will describe, dissect, and draw lessons from Connecticut’s striking success in juvenile justice  
reform for other states and communities seeking similar progress. 
The first section details the timeline and dimensions of change in Connecticut’s juvenile justice  
system over the past two decades. In 1992, Connecticut routinely locked up hundreds of youths –  
many of them never convicted or even accused of serious crimes – in decrepit and unsafe facilities while 
offering little or no treatment or rehabilitation. The state was one of only three in the nation whose justice 
system treated all 16- and 17-year-olds as adults – trying them in criminal courts, with open records, and 
sentencing many to adult prisons without education or rehabilitative services designed for adolescents.  
By 2002 there was a growing awareness that these problems could no longer be ignored.  Over the decade 
that followed, a movement for sweeping reforms began to build momentum and take root. And by 2012, 
Connecticut had a strong commitment to invest in alternatives to detention and incarceration, improve 
conditions of confinement, examine the research, and focus on treatment strategies with evidence of 
effectiveness. 
Most impressively, these changes have been accomplished in Connecticut without any added financial cost, 
and without any increase in juvenile crime or violence. To the contrary, the costs of new programs and  
services for Connecticut’s court-involved youth have been fully offset in the short-term by reduced 
expenditures for detention and confinement, and promise additional savings down the road as more youth 
desist from delinquency and crime. Arrests of youth have fallen substantially throughout the reform period, 
both for serious violent crimes and for virtually all other offense categories as well.
The report then looks under the hood of Connecticut’s reform efforts and explores the critical factors 
underlying these accomplishments. The discussion begins by detailing the main elements and key champions  
of progress and by identifying the turning points that built momentum toward reform. 
The report’s final section explores what other states or local jurisdictions can learn from Connecticut’s 
experience.  The most important lesson, it finds, is that a new and vastly improved juvenile justice system is 
within reach for any jurisdiction that summons the energy and commitment, the creativity and cooperative 
spirit to do what’s best for their children, their families, and their communities.
2JUveNIle  JUsTICe  RefORm  IN CONNeCTICUT:
1 . ReDUCeD OveRRelIaNCe ON 
CONfINemeNT 
Over the past decade, Connecticut has dramatically 
reduced the number of youth removed from home by 
delinquency courts and placed into pre-trial detention 
centers, correctional training schools, and/or other 
residential facilities. Specifically, the state has reduced 
residential commitments from 680 in 2000 to 216 in 
2011 (nearly 70%), even though most 16 year-olds, who 
were previously treated as adults, are now handled in 
the juvenile system. The average daily population in 
Connecticut’s pretrial detention centers fell from 132 in 
2006 to 94 in 2011, the year after 16-year-olds entered 
the juvenile system, allowing the state to close one of 
its three state-operated detention centers. Meanwhile, 
the under 18 population in Connecticut’s adult prisons 
fell from 403 in January 2007 to 151 in July 2012.
2 . BUIlT a CONTINUUm Of 
TaRgeTeD, hIgh-QUalITy  
NON-ResIDeNTIal PROgRams  
aND seRvICes fOR yOUTh  
Over the past 15 years, Connecticut has developed 
an array of new community-based supervision and 
treatment programs for delinquent and behaviorally 
troubled youth. Specifically, the state has expanded 
its investment in evidence-based, family-focused 
adolescent treatment programs with proven success 
in reducing problem behaviors from $300,000 in 2000 
to $39 million in 2009. In Fiscal Year 2012, 955 youths 
on probation supervision participated in intensive 
evidence-based family therapy programs and 652  
in evidence-based cognitive behavioral therapy. 
Evidence-based treatment was also provided to 
thousands of other Connecticut youths, including 
delinquent young people committed to state custody, 
status offenders diverted from juvenile court, and 
behaviorally troubled youth served in the child welfare 
and children’s mental health systems.
3 . ImPROveD CONDITIONs IN 
JUveNIle faCIlITIes 
Connecticut has undertaken sweeping reforms in 
recent years to ensure humane care for confined youth. 
After being sued in the early 1990s for overcrowding 
and problematic treatment of youth in its pre-trial 
detention facilities, Connecticut vastly improved 
detention programming, education and mental health 
services, and physical conditions in detention. After 
a series of investigations revealed severe deficiencies 
in the new $57 million Connecticut Juvenile Training 
School from 2001-2004, Connecticut permanently 
closed a high-security unit where violent incidents 
had been commonplace, temporarily suspended new 
admissions, provided intensive retraining of staff on 
behavior management, reformed disciplinary practices, 
and vastly improved programming and treatment 
throughout the facility.
4 . DIveRTeD sTaTUs OffeNDINg 
yOUTh away fROm The COURT 
sysTem aND OUT Of lOCkeD 
DeTeNTION CeNTeRs 
Until just a few years ago, Connecticut routinely sent 
youth to court and even detained them for minor 
misdeeds (truancy, running away, alcohol possession) 
that would not be illegal if committed by an adult – 
despite evidence that such harsh treatment for these 
“status offenses” is costly, ineffective, and harmful 
to youth. Since 2005, Connecticut has eliminated 
admission of youth to detention centers for status 
offenses and opened Family Support Centers (FSC) 
statewide that offer community-based treatment and 
other services for status-offending youth and their 
families rather than probation supervision. The state 
reduced judicial processing (formal petition) of status 
offender referrals from 50 percent of those filed in 
2006-07 to just 4.5 percent in 2010 and 2011. Since 
2006, the number of youth with a status offense who 
were rearrested or convicted of crimes fell by more 
than 70 percent.
3	 seveN maJOR aCCOmPlIshmeNTs
5 . kePT yOUTh OUT Of The aDUlT 
JUsTICe sysTem 
For decades, Connecticut was one of only three states 
that prosecuted and punished all 16- and 17-year-olds 
as adults. In 2007, the state enacted historic legislation 
to raise the age of juvenile jurisdiction from 16 to 18, 
effective January 1, 2010 for 16 year olds and July 1, 
2012 for 17 year olds. Even before 17 year-olds became 
eligible for juvenile court on July 1, 2012, the new law 
kept 8,325 16 year-olds from being prosecuted and 
punished in the adult criminal justice system. Extending 
juvenile jurisdiction to 16 year-olds has increased 
juvenile caseloads far less than expected (22 percent 
actual vs. 40 percent projected); as a result, the state 
spent nearly $12 million less in fiscal years 2010 and 2011 
than it had budgeted.  Meanwhile, 16 year-olds served 
by the juvenile system have had higher success rates in 
alternative programs and lower rearrest rates than youth 
15 and younger, disproving concerns that they should be 
in the adult system.
6 . aDDResseD RaCIal aND eThNIC 
DIsPaRITIes IN The JUveNIle 
JUsTICe sysTem’s TReaTmeNT  
Of yOUTh  
While Connecticut cannot claim significant 
statewide progress toward reducing racial and ethnic 
disparities in its juvenile justice system, the state 
has intensified its focus in recent years and launched 
promising new initiatives to address this pervasive 
and troubling problem. Connecticut’s Juvenile Justice 
Advisory Committee (JJAC), the state advisory group, 
commissioned three in-depth studies analyzing 
racial disparities at 18 decision points in the state’s 
law enforcement and juvenile court processes. The 
JJAC has also trained nearly 1,400 police officers on 
Disproportionate Minority Contact (DMC) since 2007. 
Pilot projects in Bridgeport and Hartford have reduced 
juvenile court referrals of Black and Hispanic students 
for misconduct at school by 40 percent (Bridgeport) 
and 78 percent (Hartford), and reduced the overall 
number of Black and Hispanic youth referred to juvenile 
court in both sites. In 2011, the state legislature enacted 
a new law requiring state juvenile justice agencies 
to prepare biennial reports on their DMC goals and 
accomplishments. 
7. ReDUCeD aRResTs aT sChOOl  
fOR ROUTINe aND NON-seRIOUs 
mIsBehavIOR 
Though Connecticut has not yet demonstrated 
significant statewide progress, it is making important 
strides. Nine Connecticut school districts have signed 
agreements with police limiting the circumstances under 
which students can be arrested at school. In one pilot 
district (Manchester), by the spring of 2012, arrests and 
expulsions both fell by more than 60 percent compared 
to the prior school year. The School-Based Diversion 
Initiative (SBDI) also is working in nine sites to promote 
mental health treatment rather than disciplinary 
or justice responses to misbehavior by emotionally 
disturbed students. An independent evaluation found 
that SBDI decreased the number of students arrested 
and/or suspended, and reduced subsequent misbehavior. 
In 2011, juvenile courts began rejecting referrals involving 
youth arrested for minor misbehavior. Of the first 221 
cases the courts refused to prosecute, more than half 
involved school arrests. Connecticut schools have also 
sharply reduced out-of-school suspensions in the past 
five years.
The BOTTOm lINe:  
COsT savINgs aND ImPROveD  
PUBlIC safeTy 
Perhaps Connecticut’s most impressive achievements 
are that its overall spending on juvenile justice (after 
adjusting for inflation) has not increased despite the 
implementation of many new programs and services, and 
the state’s juvenile crime rate has dropped considerably 
even as confinement rates plummeted. Among youth 15 
and under (the state’s traditional juvenile population), 
total arrests fell 48 percent from 2002 to 2011 and 
serious violent crime arrests fell 51 percent. Among 16 
year-olds, total arrests and serious violent crime arrests 
fell 35 percent and 26 percent respectively from 2009 to 
2011, the first two years after Connecticut 16 year-olds 
became eligible for juvenile court. Meanwhile, after 
adjusting for inflation, the two agencies that administer 
Connecticut’s juvenile justice system -- the Department 
of Children and Families and the Judicial Branch’s Court 
Support Services Division -- spent $2 million less on 
juvenile programs and facilities in the 2011-12 fiscal year 
than they had 10 years earlier.
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TIMELINE OF ChaNgE:
T h e  T R a N s fO R m aT I O N  I N  C O N N e C T I C U T ’ s  J U v e N I l e  J U sT I C e  s y sT e m  Ov e R  T wO  D e C a D e s
5     1992                                    2002                               2012
1992
a  D e e P ly  f l aw e D  s y sT e m
When you ask William Carbone about the state of Connecticut’s juvenile detention centers in the 
early 1990s, he can’t help but grimace. “The facility in Bridgeport was an embarrassment to walk 
through,” exclaimed Carbone, who speaks from experience; not only has he overseen the state’s 
juvenile probation and detention programs as executive director of the Court Support Services 
Division since its founding in 1999, but he held other senior positions in the Connecticut Judicial 
Branch and the Office of Policy and Management for a decade and a half before that. “There  
was no space for recreation; no space for programming.” 1 Indeed, the problems involved much 
more than the physical plant and affected not just Bridgeport, but all three Connecticut detention 
centers providing short-term custody of youth pending court hearings or awaiting placement  
to residential facilities. A class action lawsuit filed in 1993 exposed that the facilities were:
OveRCROwDeD 
Located in New Haven, Bridgeport and Hartford, the 
detention centers for youth ages 15 and younger suffered 
from severe overcrowding, with an average population 
of 114 youths per night (and sometimes more than 130) 
crammed into three facilities designed to hold a total of 
64. As a result, many youth slept on floors or doubled or 
tripled up in cells built for one.
2							
UNsaNITaRy 
Many of the rooms had no toilets, and sometimes – 
when guards were slow to respond or refused to let 
youth out of their cells – children were left with no 
choice but to urinate on the floor or into towels.
haRsh 
Often, children who misbehaved were placed on room 
confinement – locked alone, day and night, sometimes 
for days at a time.
UNsafe 
The state employed no classification system to separate 
youth accused of violent offenses from those who were 
truant or were caught shoplifting, younger children from 
older teens, or large youth from small. Combined with 
the severe crowding that forced multiple youth into 
cells designed for one, this put youth in danger. Several 
sexual assaults were reported.
NegleCTfUl 
Despite the acute needs of many detained youth, 
screening and treatment for mental health issues were 
inadequate. In some cases, young people didn’t even 
receive their prescribed medications. 
UNCONsTITUTIONal 
Education for detained children typically lasted just two 
hours per day, and – in violation of federal constitutional 
requirements – the facilities routinely failed to assess 
the special education needs faced by a large share of the 
detained population or to follow individual education 
plans for youth known to have learning disabilities. 
OveRly PUNITIve 
Perhaps worst of all, most of the children exposed to 
these conditions weren’t accused of serious offenses or 
didn’t pose significant risk to Connecticut’s citizenry.   
The first named plaintiff in the detention lawsuit, Emily J., 
for instance, was never charged with a crime.  A learning-
disabled 13 year-old with a homeless mother and missing 
father, Emily J. had been arrested only for truancy.  Yet 
she spent months in detention, confined to a cell with 
two other girls, often for more than 21 hours per day.  
Indeed, most of the 3,000 youths placed into Connecticut 
detention centers in 1992 were accused of nothing more 
than misdemeanors, or like Emily J., status offenses such 
truancy or running away that would not be illegal for adults. 
The problems in Connecticut’s juvenile justice system 
were not limited to the detention centers:  the system 
was plagued with shortcomings, top to bottom. 
6ExCESSIVE RELIaNCE ON INCaRCERaTION  
aNd OUT-OF-hOME pLaCEMENTS 
Like the detention centers, Connecticut’s long-term 
facilities were also overflowing with youth ages 15 and 
younger who posed few dangers. 
At the state’s youth correctional facility, called the Long 
Lane School, just one-third of residents in the early 1990s 
were “serious juvenile offenders” found guilty of high-
level felony crimes, whereas 40 percent were adjudicated 
only for misdemeanors or for violating court orders 
stemming from a truancy charge or other status offense.
3
However, many Long Lane residents had serious social 
and mental health issues: 70 percent had special 
education needs, most were years behind in school,  
half were victims of abuse or neglect, and three-fourths 
had a history of running away from home.
4
 Most were 
from low income families.
5
 Opened in 1870, Long 
Lane wasn’t designed or equipped to work with these 
low-risk, high-needs children, and its staff had limited 
capacity to provide mental health or social services 
counseling or treatment.
6
Long Lane’s population (which averaged 230 children) 
consistently exceeded its design capacity of 172.
7
 
Meanwhile, hundreds of other youths adjudicated in 
Connecticut’s delinquency courts with even less serious 
records than the Long Lane population were removed 
from home and placed in private residential programs. For 
instance, more than 150 youths per year were committed 
to correctional or residential facilities in the early 1990s 
based on probation violations, not new offenses.
8
UNSaFE aNd INhUMaNE CONdITIONS OF 
CONFINEMENT 
Unlike the state’s detention centers, no class-action 
lawsuit was ever filed over conditions at Long Lane, 
and the facility received little scrutiny until 1998, when 
15 year-old Tabatha Ann Brendle hanged herself there. 
Investigations following this tragedy revealed that youth 
confined at Long Lane endured shameful conditions and 
treatment, including:
• Widespread use of lockdowns and solitary confinement;
9
• Frequent use of physical restraints. While no data is 
now accessible for 1992, published information from 
1997-98 revealed 544 incidents in 12 months, with 
many youth handcuffed and foot-shackled to their 
beds, sometimes for hours;
10
• Lax suicide prevention protocols, despite an average  
of two suicide attempts every month.
11
Summing up conditions at Long Lane, the Hartford 
Courant in 1998 described the facility as “deplorable,”  
and a “wretched warehouse.” 
12
LaCk OF NON-RESIdENTIaL aLTERNaTIVES
Despite the minimal risks posed by most youth in Con-
necticut’s detention centers and at Long Lane, for the 
most part the state did not support any alternative pro-
grams in 1992 – options such as community supervision, 
day treatment or home-based therapy programs – that 
could be used in lieu of detaining children or commit-
ting them to a state-funded residential facility.*
In 1995, Long Lane’s superintendent confessed to the 
Hartford Courant that “we need to develop a lot more 
community resources for kids who should be out of 
here. Some kids are here for being persistent runaways or 
for breaking a judge’s curfew. They shouldn’t be here.’’ 
13
The dearth of community programs was especially 
glaring in light of the costs: locking non-dangerous 
children inside these troubled facilities cost Connecticut 
taxpayers upwards of $200 per day each
14
 – several 
times the price of even the most ambitious non-
residential alternative program.
yOUTh pROSECUTEd aNd pUNIShEd  
aS adULTS
Connecticut’s lopsided overreliance on confinement  
and the poor treatment provided to youth in custody 
were troubling, but not unique. Similar flaws could  
be observed in juvenile justice systems across the  
nation. For instance, a 1993 study of 28 states found  
that only 14 percent of youth in correctional training 
schools were committed for violent offenses, while 
more than half were committed for property or drug 
crimes and were serving their first terms in a state 
institution.
15
 And a national review of conditions in 
juvenile detention and corrections facilities found 
pervasive overcrowding and understaffing, widespread 
violence against youth and staff, and glaring gaps in 
suicide prevention.
16
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*  One	exception	to	this	lack	of	non-residential	programming	was	an	experimental	project	funded	and	evaluated	by	Connecticut’s	Juvenile	Justice	Advisory	
		Committee,	using	funds	from	the	federal	Juvenile	Justice	and	Delinquency	Prevention	Act.
7544 incidents of physical restraint of confined youth were 
documented in 1997-98 at long lane school
What made Connecticut’s juvenile system unusual and 
especially problematic was that the maximum age of 
juvenile jurisdiction was 15. Unlike all but two other 
states (New York and North Carolina), in Connecticut 
every 16 or 17 year-old arrested or convicted of 
any offense, even a common misdemeanor, such as 
shoplifting or simple assault, was prosecuted as an  
adult, and most were given a criminal record that would 
last a lifetime. In 37 states and the District of Columbia, 
the maximum age of juvenile jurisdiction was 17, and in 
10 other states 16. As a result of this draconian public 
policy, 13,000 young people ages 16 and 17 who were 
arrested in Connecticut each year were denied the 
protections of the juvenile justice system.
17
 Many of  
the 16 and 17 year-olds arrested were not prosecuted  
or convicted, while others convicted for minor offenses 
completed community service or paid small fines or 
restitution.  But thousands of underage youth were 
placed on probation each year, and several hundred 
16 and 17 year-olds each year were sentenced to adult 
prisons, where they received very limited education 
and little rehabilitative counseling developmentally 
appropriate for adolescents.
INappROpRIaTE pROSECUTION aNd 
dETENTION OF STaTUS OFFENdERS
Connecticut’s punitive approach to youth also applied 
to those under 16, including young people who had 
committed no crime. In 1992, more than 2,000 
Connecticut children ages 15 and younger were referred 
to juvenile court under the Family With Service Needs 
(or FWSN) law for status offenses, such as skipping 
school, running away from home, or other behavior that 
would not be illegal for adults.
18
 More than one-third  
of these children were required to participate in a formal 
court hearing.
19
Many youth adjudicated as status offenders were placed 
on court-ordered probation supervision, and then, if they 
violated the terms of their probation by, for instance 
skipping school, violating a curfew, or testing positive for 
drugs, they could be brought back to court, adjudicated 
delinquent, and removed from their homes. Hundreds 
of status-offending youth were confined in a detention 
center each year for probation rule violations,
20
 and 
dozens were committed to state custody as delinquent 
and sent to the Long Lane training school or other 
residential facilities.
21
UNEqUaL TREaTMENT OF BLaCk aNd 
hISpaNIC yOUTh
In 1988, the U.S. Congress amended the federal Juvenile 
Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act to add a fourth 
core requirement for states to remain eligible for 
federal juvenile justice funding. The prior requirements 
included rules to deinstitutionalize status offenders, 
limit confinement of juveniles in adult jails, and maintain 
sight and sound separation between juveniles and adults 
when youth were held in jails or prison. With the 1988 
amendment, Congress required states to address (or at 
least examine) the problem of disproportionate minority 
confinement – a pervasive trend in juvenile justice in 
which children of color are detained and incarcerated 
at higher rates than White youth even when they have 
similar offending histories. 
Seven years later, Connecticut released a comprehensive 
analysis of racial disparities in juvenile justice. The 
findings were eye-opening. The 1990 U.S. census showed 
that three-fourths of the state’s youth were non-
Hispanic Whites. Yet more than three-fourths of youth 
confined at Long Lane School were Black or Hispanic, 
even though just 11 and 10 percent of the state’s youth 
population were Black or Hispanic, respectively.
22
 The 
minority overrepresentation study also found that, 
controlling for offense and other characteristics, 
Black and Hispanic youth were more likely than White 
youth to be detained and held for longer periods in 
detention. Once committed to state custody, Black and 
Hispanic youth were also more likely than their White 
counterparts to be placed at the Long Lane training 
school, held in a maximum security unit, and remain 
longer at the facility.
23
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8aN INEFFECTIVE SySTEM
Virtually	nothing	about	the	system	in	1992	was	results-oriented.	To	that	point,	little	research	
had	been	compiled	to	show	convincingly	that	any	strategy	worked	better	than	any	other,	
and	little	effort	was	expended	in	the	state	to	track	outcomes,	see	what	was	working	(or	not	
working),	or	reallocate	resources	to	strategies	that	proved	effective.	
No	one	measured	juvenile	recidivism	in	Connecticut.	Little	or	no	energy	was	spent	examining	
the	costs	and	benefits,	in	terms	of	public	safety	or	youth	success,	of	sending	young	people	
to	the	training	school	versus	community-based	alternatives.	Serious	proposals	involving	
new	approaches	to	treating,	supervising	or	counseling	court-involved	children,	such	as	day	
treatment	centers,	intensive	probation,	electronic	monitoring,	or	family	counseling,	were	
rarely	proposed	or	debated	by	policymakers.	Whereas	Connecticut	began	in	the	early	1990s	
to	develop	a	range	of	alternative	sanctions	programming	for	adults,	the	state	continued	to	
send	a	constant	stream	of	children,	most	of	them	youth	of	color,	and	few	with	any	history	of	
committing	serious	crimes,	into	cramped	detention	facilities	and	then	to	the	century-old	Long	
Lane	training	school.	
This	situation	was	allowed	to	persist	because,	quite	simply,	juvenile	justice	remained	a	
backwater	in	Connecticut	state	government.	Mike	Lawlor,	an	East	Haven	prosecutor	who	was	
elected	to	the	state	legislature	in	1986,	admits	that	“I	didn’t	know	anything	about	juvenile	
justice”	in	the	early	1990s,	even	though	he	served	on	the	Judiciary	Committee	from	his	very	
first	day	in	office.24
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9maJOR DevelOPmeNTs  1992-2002
1993: The lawsUIT 
In October 1993, the Connecticut Civil Liberties Union (CCLU) filed the Emily J. lawsuit seeking redress for 
114 separate deficiencies in the state’s treatment of youth within the pre-trial detention centers, the poor 
quality of education and mental health services, and the lack of alternative-to-detention programming  
for youth.  
 Initially, the state fought the litigation. But gradually, state leaders switched gears and entered into 
negotiations to settle it.  “Conditions in the centers were unacceptable,” said Thomas White, who served 
as Connecticut’s Director of Detention Services in the mid-1990s. The thinking, White recalls, was that “if 
we felt we wanted to make dramatic changes to detention in the state, why fight the lawsuit when we 
could partner with the court and the CCLU under the consent decree?” 
25
 Christine Rapillo, Director of 
Juvenile Delinquency Defense and Child Protection in Connecticut’s Office of the Chief Public Defender, 
recalls the Emily J. lawsuit as a crucial first step in Connecticut’s juvenile justice reform movement: “It 
really began to focus the state’s attention on what the juvenile justice system is supposed to be.” 
26
1995: The RefORm law 
Just as youth crime was becoming a headline issue in 1995, Mike Lawlor was named co-chair of the 
Judiciary Committee and charged with spearheading the development of a major juvenile justice reform 
law. The first thing Lawlor discovered about Connecticut’s juvenile justice system was how insulated it 
had been. “Nobody had answers to even basic questions about how the system worked, or how well. 
There was a big cone of silence around [juvenile justice], and we were opening up the window shade and 
looking inside.” 
27
 Suddenly, juvenile justice “was really a hot political issue,” Lawlor recalls.  Connecticut’s juvenile 
crime rates were way up, a 15 year-old’s heinous double-homicide case was making headlines in local 
newspapers, and a nationwide, full-scale public panic had erupted over a rapid rise in juvenile violent 
crimes.  Lawlor involved many colleagues and stakeholders, including lawyers, probation officers, 
police, prosecutors, psychologists, university professors and other experts, in his efforts to develop a 
comprehensive juvenile justice reform package. Together, they crafted an elaborate compromise between 
the Democrat-dominated legislature and Republican Governor John Rowland. 
 The bill addressed three central concerns of the state’s law-and-order conservatives: (1) changing the 
purpose clause of the state’s juvenile code to focus on public safety and accountability, not just the best 
interests of the child; (2) broadening the list of offenses requiring automatic transfer to adult court and 
giving prosecutors discretion to transfer other cases; and (3) relaxing confidentiality rules to give victims 
and their families the right to learn about sanctions imposed on juveniles who harmed them. 
 However, most of the bill’s text and virtually all of its funding supported a dramatic expansion of the 
state’s diversion and intervention programs for youth.  In January 1996, a policy group authorized under 
the law issued a plan calling for $16 million in new funding for the recommended treatment programs in 
the first three years, plus an additional $62 million funded through savings from downsizing the Long Lane 
training school and other existing programs.
28
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10
maJOR DevelOPmeNTs  1992-2002
1997: The seTTlemeNT 
In March 1997, Federal District Court Judge Richard Chatigny signed off on a consent decree to settle the 
Emily J. lawsuit. Under the settlement, which involved five years of federal court supervision, the state 
agreed to reduce crowding; improve education, recreation, and mental health services; and train staff in 
behavior management to reduce the use of seclusion and restraints. In addition, the state pledged to begin 
funding a wide range of mental health programs and other community-based alternatives to reduce the 
reliance on detention for youth involved in less serious crimes.
29
1998: The sUICIDe 
The September 1998 suicide of Tabatha Ann Brendle, a girl confined inside the state’s Long Lane training 
school, prompted a major investigation at Long Lane and many critical news stories. The state’s Child Fatality 
Review Board found that Tabatha had been sexually abused and neglected repeatedly throughout her life, 
and had attempted suicide on previous occasions at Long Lane and in earlier child welfare placements. 
“There’s no question that Tabatha was in need of intensive psychiatric treatment and that the counseling 
provided was simply insufficient to meet her needs,” the report found.
30
 The fatality review panel also 
examined the conditions at Long Lane generally, finding “grossly inadequate” staffing, deficient mental 
health care, a decaying and poorly lit physical plant, flawed suicide prevention, and widespread overreliance 
on harsh disciplinary tactics – particularly seclusion, physical takedowns, and mechanical restraint chairs  
– without a functioning grievance process to investigate possible abuses and hold staff accountable.
31
 The 
Hartford Courant summed up the situation at Long Lane as “neglect bordering on cruelty.” 
32
1999: The CONsOlIDaTION 
In early 1999, Connecticut reorganized its Judicial Branch, consolidating the state’s juvenile and adult 
probation offices, juvenile detention centers, family services division, bail commissioner, and Office of 
Alternative Sanctions into a single unit called the Court Support Services Division. The consolidation proved 
a crucial turning point in Connecticut’s journey toward juvenile justice reform in two ways. First, by putting 
the juvenile detention, probation, and alternative sanctions offices under a single roof, it created a powerful 
hub for new thinking about juvenile justice and for creating an integrated system. Second, the man named 
to lead the new division, William Carbone, proved a tireless and widely respected innovator. Formerly 
the director of Connecticut’s Office of Alternative Sanctions, Carbone has led the division ever since and 
has used his position to continually modernize its approaches to juvenile justice, embracing research and 
building the data-gathering and analysis capabilities necessary to monitor outcomes, make adjustments, and 
maximize successful outcomes for youth.
2001: The New TRaININg sChOOl 
Following Tabatha’s suicide, Connecticut’s legislature approved funds for a new youth corrections facility 
for boys to replace Long Lane. However, Connecticut’s governor, John Rowland, rejected recommendations 
to build a therapeutic facility or a regionalized network of smaller facilities (following the successful 
model employed in Missouri). Instead, Rowland fast-tracked a plan to build a new facility modeled after a 
maximum security adult prison in Ohio that offered little accommodation for adolescents’ greater need for 
educational space.
33
 The contract to build the training school was awarded on an emergency no-bid basis. 
Later, investigators would find that the contracting process had been rigged, leading to Governor Rowland’s 
resignation from office in 2004 and also prison terms for Rowland, his chief of staff, and the contractor.
34
  
By then, however, the facility was already a fait accompli: the Connecticut Juvenile Training School opened its 
doors and launched operations in August 2001.
35
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2002
g R Ow I N g  aT T e N T I O N,  B U T  f e w  s O lU T I O N s
This lack of scrutiny for juvenile justice did not persist. Repeatedly over the decade from  
1992 to 2002, Connecticut’s juvenile system burst into the news. Frequently, in fact, the system 
found itself on the front pages of state newspapers in stories that were often unflattering 
and sometimes alarming. All this attention, however, brought only modest change and little 
improvement for Connecticut young people in the state’s juvenile courts and corrections  
system. Other than conditions and programming inside the state’s pre-trial detention centers, 
which improved substantially as a result of the Emily J. lawsuit, virtually all the other flaws 
apparent in 1992 still remained 10 years later. 
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CONTINUEd OVERRELIaNCE ON CONFINEMENT
Despite the settlement of the Emily J. lawsuit in 1997, 
Connecticut’s detention centers remained severely 
overcrowded in 2002. Many youth, some as young as 10, 
were detained for months due to behavioral or mental 
health problems, not delinquency,
36
 awaiting mental 
health evaluations or placement in treatment facilities.
37
 
At the end of 2001, a leading community youth agency 
in Bridgeport, the Regional Youth Adult Social Action 
Partnership (RYASAP), completed a study of youth 
confined inside the Bridgeport Juvenile Detention 
Center. It found that just 15% of confined youth 
were accused of felonies. Most were confined for 
misdemeanors (47%) or violations of probation rules 
(33%).
38
 “The majority of children are in detention for 
violating a court order requiring them to participate  
in a service or program… or for challenging the judge, 
probation officer or detention official,” the study found. 
“Others are in detention because the services they need 
are not available in the community.” 
At the new Connecticut Juvenile Training School 
(CJTS), which opened in 2001 to replace Long Lane, the 
average daily population hovered at 153 in 2001, and it 
still included many low-risk youth. For instance, just 37 
youths at the training school in March 2002 were guilty 
of violent offenses, of which 21 were simple fights.
39
 
Most youth were confined for criminal mischief, drug 
possession, breach of peace, disorderly conduct, petty 
larceny, and other lesser offenses.
40
 In 2003, a study by 
the New England Juvenile Defenders Center found that 
Connecticut had the highest youth incarceration rate  
in New England.
41
TROUBLINg TREaTMENT OF CONFINEd  
yOUTh pERSISTS
By 2002, after five years of court-supervised remedies 
and reforms under the Emily J. consent decree, 
conditions inside Connecticut’s detention centers had 
improved on many measures: the facilities had been 
renovated physically; counseling staff had been hired; 
training had improved for custody staff; an in-house 
medical service system was developed; educational 
programming and recreational offerings were expanded; 
suicide prevention protocols were strengthened; 
and new alternative-to-detention programs opened.  
However, crowding was still problematic in the 
detention centers, with as many as 20 youths sleeping 
on the floor on a given night,
42
 and the state remained 
at odds with advocates over the continuing lack of 
appropriate services and placements for youth with 
serious mental health needs. After hearing testimony 
from local judges, state detention staff, and outside 
experts, the federal judge in the Emily J. lawsuit ruled in 
February 2002 that “children are not getting timely and 
adequate mental health services… [and] the evidence 
shows their conditions can and have worsened while 
they are being held in detention.’’ 
43
Conditions were even more troubling in the state’s 
new training school for boys.
44
 Reports about lack of 
programming and problematic treatment of youth began 
almost as soon as the training school opened its doors. 
A September 2002 report from Connecticut’s Child 
Advocate Jeanne Milstein and Attorney General  
Richard Blumenthal called the new facility a “dismal 
failure”
45
 and found that “suicidal children go unsupervised 
12
and young boys are illegally restrained for days on 
end.” 
46
 The Child Advocate and Attorney General 
also documented severe problems in the care of girls 
remaining at Long Lane School in 2002, including 
poor suicide prevention and alarming overreliance on 
seclusion.
47
 Out-of-state experts and officials from the 
Department of Children and Families (which operated 
both facilities) also concluded that the new training 
school was unsatisfactory.
48
NON-RESIdENTIaL pROgRaMS NOw  
aVaILaBLE, BUT INEFFECTIVE
As part of the comprehensive juvenile justice reform 
bill enacted in 1995, Connecticut allocated substantial 
funding for non-residential and community programs for 
the first time in its history. The 1997 Emily J. settlement 
committed the state to providing even more alternative-
to-detention programming, as well as new mental health 
programs and facilities to reduce the confinement 
of emotionally and behaviorally troubled children in 
detention. Quickly, the state contracted with local 
agencies for a wide range of new community programs 
under such titles as Gateway Services, Juvenile Justice 
Centers, Intensive Case Management, and Juvenile 
Supervision and Reporting Centers.  The combined 
budget quickly rose to exceed $10 million per year.
49
While these new programs addressed an urgent void in 
the Connecticut system, few were informed by research 
that just then was emerging about best practices for 
working with troubled teens,* and many of the agencies 
selected to run the programs lacked capacity and 
experience. 
Initially, the programs received little scrutiny, in part 
because Connecticut had no procedure to track 
outcomes. But in 2000, the state commissioned the 
Connecticut Policy and Economic Council to provide 
an in-depth recidivism analysis. The resulting report, 
formally released in August 2002, showed that most of 
the 22 alternative programs evaluated were ineffective.
50
 
Overall, participants in the alternative programs in 1999 
had higher rates of recidivism than youth in 1994 who 
did not participate in any program.
51
 Only two of the 
22 alternative programs studied significantly reduced 
recidivism.
51
 The results were “a major shock and 
surprise,’’ a key state senator, Donald E. Williams Jr., told 
the Hartford Courant. Meanwhile, other studies found 
that major gaps remained in mental health services
53
 for 
system-involved youth, programming for girls remained 
inadequate,
54
 and the state still lacked any process to 
assess youth and ensure they were receiving services 
appropriate to their needs.
55
ThOUSaNdS OF ChILdREN STILL TRIEd aNd 
pUNIShEd IN ThE adULT JUSTICE SySTEM
Unlike the intense scrutiny faced by the juvenile 
courts and corrections system over this decade, little 
attention was paid to the state’s handling of older 
children, as Connecticut remained one of only three 
states that treated all court-involved 16- and 17 year-
olds as adults.  About 12,000 16- and 17 year-olds were 
referred to the adult justice system for law violations in 
2002-03 (excluding motor vehicle infractions).
56
 Roughly 
1,700 were placed on adult probation, and about 300 
Connecticut youths were confined on any given day in 
adult jails or prisons.
57
In 2003, Connecticut Voices for Children (www.ctvoices.
org) reported that Connecticut led the nation in the 
number of adult jail and prison inmates under age 18, 
with 20% more youth confined than any other state. The 
report noted that Connecticut incarcerated more youth 
in adult prisons than 29 other states combined.
58
MORE yOUTh ThaN EVER pROSECUTEd  
FOR STaTUS OFFENSES 
Connecticut’s handling of status offenses also changed 
little from 1992 to 2002.  In fact, the number of youth 
referred to the juvenile court on these non-criminal 
charges was rising to an all-time high. Whereas the state 
referred 2,500 youths to court in 1992 for status offenses 
such as truancy, curfew violations, running away and 
other behaviors, by 2002, the figure had grown to more 
than 4,000.
59
 More than half the youth referred to court 
on status offenses had their cases formally processed in 
juvenile court, and nearly 1,000 of them were placed on 
court-ordered probation supervision.
60
 Several hundred 
were placed in locked detention facilities for violating 
probation – even though they had committed no crime. 
Neither Connecticut’s Department of Children and 
Families nor the Judicial Branch’s Court Support Services 
Division (which oversees juvenile probation) offered 
any programs or services designed specifically for 
these youth and their families.  Most were placed on 
probation or referred to other agencies. An alarming 
number of these underserved youth soon returned to 
* By contrast, a 2001 study found that the one evidence-based family therapy program launched for troubled Connecticut teens by the Department of Children and 
Families in 1999, Multisystemic Therapy (MST), was proving effective. Poitras, Colin, “State Tries New Family Counseling – Multisystemic Approach May Help More 
Youths,” Harford Courant, January 30, 2002. 
     1992                                    2002                               2012
13
court charged with probation violations or with actual 
crimes. Though no data are available for 2002, 566 
youths referred to court on status offense charges in the 
2006-07 fiscal year (16 percent of all cases) were found 
guilty of subsequent crimes within 6 months.
61
RaCIaL dISpaRITIES – MOdEST pROgRESS
In 2001, Connecticut released its second comprehensive 
analysis of racial and ethnic overrepresentation in 
juvenile justice, examining data from the 1998-99 
program year. The study found that racial imbalances 
had been reduced since the early 1990s at a few decision 
points. Unlike in 1991, Black and Hispanic youth accused 
of serious offenses were no longer more likely than 
comparable White youth to be convicted of a serious 
charge, and no longer more likely than White youth 
to be placed in a correctional facility (as opposed to 
placement in a therapeutic facility) if convicted.
62
However, many significant racial disparities remained. 
Black and Hispanic youth comprised more than 70 
percent of the population placed in detention or 
committed to the Long Lane training school in 1999, 
more than three times their share of the state’s overall 
youth population.
63
 Another study published in 2003 
found that youth of color comprised 15.5 percent of 
the state’s youth population, but they represented 74 
percent of youth ordered into residential custody by 
Connecticut delinquency courts, the highest minority 
overrepresentation rate in New England.
64
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a CRESCENdO aNd a TURNINg pOINT
The	steady	drumbeat	of	increasingly	worrisome	developments	during	the	prior	decade	
reached	a	crescendo	in	2001	and	2002	with	a	series	of	eye-opening	reports	and	incidents	
occurring	in	rapid	succession:	alarming	problems	were	revealed	at	the	state’s	brand	new	
training	school,	overcrowding	continued	at	the	Bridgeport	Juvenile	Detention	Center,	and	
youth	placed	into	the	state’s	new	alternative	programs	experienced	shocking	failure	rates.	
Developments	related	to	the	Emily	J.	lawsuit	also	came	at	a	rapid	pace	in	2001	and	2002.	
Under	the	1997	Emily	J.	settlement	agreement,	the	five-year	federal	court	supervision	period	
was	scheduled	to	end	in	2002.	But	Emily	J.	litigator	Martha	Stone	of	the	Center	for	Children’s	
Advocacy	at	the	University	of	Connecticut	School	of	Law	remained	unsatisfied.		The	state,	
she	said,	had	not	fulfilled	its	obligation	to	provide	timely	and	sufficient	care	to	youth	with	
serious	mental	illnesses	and	to	keep	them	from	languishing	in	detention.	The	Department	
of	Children	and	Families	contested	the	argument,	resulting	in	damning	testimony	from	
state	judges	and	other	experts	who	described	their	frustration	as	children	waited	weeks	in	
detention	due	to	the	lack	of	residential	and	community-based	treatment	programs.	Soon	
after,	the	presiding	judge	in	the	Emily	J.	case	ruled	that	the	state	was	violating	children’s	
rights	to	timely	care,	and	a	new	settlement	agreement	was	signed.
After	all	the	distressing	developments	during	this	decade,	the	system’s	problems	were	widely	
understood	by	2002	and	impossible	to	sweep	under	a	rug.	Even	the	purported	solutions	–	
a	settlement	agreement,	new	alternative	programs,	a	new	training	school	–	were	not	yet	
turning	the	tide.	
Perhaps	the	best	news	to	emerge	over	the	decade	from	1992-2002	was	that,	by	the	time	
2002	rolled	in,	these	grave	deficiencies	plaguing	the	state’s	juvenile	justice	system	were	
increasingly	obvious	to	state	leaders	and	the	public.	Connecticut	was	in	turmoil	over	juvenile	
justice,	and	a	vigorous	reform	movement	was	beginning	to	take	root.	
14
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a  T R a N s fO R m e D  s y sT e m
Over the decade from 2002 to 2012, Connecticut transformed its juvenile justice system.  
Of  the seven core problems it was facing – the seven focus areas of this report – Connecticut has:
• Fundamentally solved two – ending both the criminalization of status offenders and the  
practice of routinely trying and punishing 16- and 17-year-olds in the adult justice system;
• Made dramatic improvements on three other challenges—sharply reducing overreliance on 
confinement, improving treatment of confined children, and building an exemplary continuum  
of effective community-based services; and 
• Launched ambitious and sophisticated new efforts to combat the remaining two challenges— 
unequal treatment of Hispanic and Black youth and overly harsh school discipline, which 
included excessive arrests at school for low-level misbehavior. 
Connecticut has made these improvements without increasing its budget for juvenile justice 
(adjusted for inflation), and the changes have had no negative impact on crime or public safety  
in the state. Rather, youth offense rates have declined steadily throughout the reform period.
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RaISINg ThE agE OF JUVENILE JURISdICTION
On July 1, 2012, Connecticut 17 year-olds came under 
the jurisdiction of the juvenile justice system – the final 
step in the long struggle to end the state’s harsh and 
counterproductive practice of sending children who 
commit crimes to the adult justice system. 
The reform effort was spearheaded by the Connecticut 
Juvenile Justice Alliance (Alliance), which was formed 
in late 2001 by a coalition of the state’s leading youth 
advocates. Initially, the Alliance’s reform agenda did 
not focus on the age of juvenile court jurisdiction, and 
prospects for raising the age looked poor after a high-
level panel led by the state’s chief juvenile court judge 
issued a report in February 2004 estimating that adding 
16 and 17 year-olds to the juvenile caseload would cost 
the state $84 million in higher operating expenses and 
$81 million in new construction costs.
65		
The report also 
suggested that the change might have a detrimental 
effect on children already in the system.
66
Nonetheless, members of the Alliance saw the 
opportunity for success and embraced the issue. It 
rolled out the “Raise the Age Connecticut” campaign 
in early 2005 based on a recommendation from the 
Campaign for Youth Justice (www.cfyj.org), a national 
advocacy organization that offered to provide both 
financial and logistical support for Connecticut’s efforts. 
The Alliance engaged leaders in the state legislature, 
won over a handful of key judges, mobilized families, 
fed stories to the media, and launched an all-out 
education and advocacy blitz to push the reform effort. 
In 2006, moved by testimony from the mother of a 17 
year-old mentally ill boy who committed suicide while 
incarcerated in one of Connecticut’s adult prisons, the 
legislature authorized a new panel, which included 
members of the Alliance, to develop a plan for raising 
the age.  A year later – in July 2007 – the state enacted 
an historic Raise the Age law, based on a plan ironed out 
through intensive negotiations involving all the state’s 
 more than 8,000 youths have been spared prosecution in  
adult courts as of June 30, 2012
16
key stakeholders. The law called for 16 and 17 year-olds 
to enter the juvenile system beginning on January 1, 2010. 
However, faced with a state budget crisis and continuing 
resistance from some law enforcement leaders, the 
legislature amended the law in 2009 to slow down the 
implementation – allowing 16 year-olds to enter the 
juvenile system at the start of 2010 as scheduled, but 
delaying the entry of 17 year-olds until July 1, 2012.
Sarah Bryer, director of the National Juvenile Justice 
Network, calls Connecticut’s Raise the Age law “perhaps 
the most salient victory we’ve seen” nationally in 
juvenile justice reform. “When you’re one of only three 
states that treats 16 year-olds as adults, and when you 
then step up and say ‘no more,’ it’s a big deal. It brought 
a lot of attention to the issue nationally.” 
67
 
From the perspective of Connecticut’s children, Raise 
the Age has been even more significant, and will only 
grow more so in subsequent years now that 17 year-
olds are included in the juvenile system.
68
 Already, 
from January 1, 2010 to June 30, 2012, 8,325 16 year-olds 
have been spared prosecution and punishment in the 
adult criminal justice system, and thousands more have 
benefitted from juvenile counseling and treatment 
programs previously unavailable to them.
Population counts in the state’s detention centers have 
risen only marginally since Raise the Age went into 
effect, remaining well below capacity, and the training 
school’s population has seen no measurable growth. In 
fact, in the midst of the Raise the Age implementation, 
Connecticut actually shut down one of its three state-
Source: Crimes Analysis Unit, CT State 
Police, CT Department of Emergency 
Services and Public Protection
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operated detention centers due to low census in 2011, 
saving $2.45 million in the state’s fiscal year 2011-12 budget.
69	
Meanwhile, 16 year-olds served by the juvenile courts and 
corrections system have achieved higher success rates in 
alternative programs and lower rearrest rates than youth 
15 and younger – refuting arguments that 16 year-olds are 
not appropriate for the juvenile justice system.
70
Both Connecticut state agencies working with justice-
involved youth continue to adjust their policies and add 
new programming to suit the population of older youth. 
The Department of Children and Families (DCF) -- which 
operates the state’s training school, oversees other 
residential facilities, and provides aftercare for youth 
returning home from these placements -- has added 
vocational training and college-level classes for youth 
at the training school.  To enhance reentry, DCF also 
created supervised independent living facilities where 
youth without access to a safe and secure family home 
can begin learning to live on their own after release from 
correctional custody or residential treatment. The Court 
Support Services Division, which operates probation 
and community-based programs and treatment services 
for probation youth, has also added a number of new 
educational and vocational services for older youth, plus 
training and support to help them develop independent 
living skills. 
“We’re adjusting to working with these older youth,” said 
Brett Rayford, Director of DCF’s Division of Adolescent 
and Juvenile Services. “They present different challenges, 
and sometimes they have those [negative] behaviors 
pretty ingrained. Our job is to instill hope, and to develop 
their educational and vocational skills while teaching 
them to live independently.” 
71
pROgRaMS, NOT pROSECUTION FOR  
STaTUS OFFENdERS 
Swept up in the zero tolerance ethos of the 1990s 
through early 2000’s, Connecticut steadily increased 
the number of youth referred to court under the 
state’s status offender law, Family With Service Needs 
(or FWSN). Referrals to court for status offenses grew 
from just under 2,100 in 1994 to more than 4,000 in 
2000.  Numbers remained above 4,000 every year 
until 2007, when reforms began taking hold. In 2004, 
65 percent of the 4,161 FWSN cases were handled 
judicially and had their cases heard in court (versus 35 
percent diverted from court), and 23 percent of the 
cases reaching court (over 600 cases) resulted in formal 
probation supervision.
72
 Hundreds of these youths were 
subsequently detained for violating probation rules, 
and about 80 were committed to state custody as 
delinquent in 2004 without ever committing a crime.
73
All that began to change in 2005 when the legislature 
approved a bill prohibiting detention for violating a 
court order in any case arising from a status offense. 
Known as the “valid court order” exception, this tactic 
is still used around the country to get around the 
federal Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act’s 
prohibition on locking youth up for status offenses. 
Beginning in 2007, youth in Connecticut could no 
longer be detained or committed to custody solely for 
violating probation or disobeying a judge’s order. Martha 
Stone, a founding member of the Alliance, litigator in the 
Emily J. lawsuit and director of the Center for Children’s 
Advocacy (www.kidscounsel.org), worked with key 
legislators to make the case for change. 
Source:  Justice Research Center, 
FWSN Process and Outcome Evaluation, 2010
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STATUS-OFFENDER LAW
TAKES EFFECT AS OF 
OCTOBER 1, 2007
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*	The	legislature	initially	provided	funding	for	just	four	Family	Support	Centers	–	located	in	Hartford,	Bridgeport,	New	Haven,	and	Waterbury.	Beginning	in	2010,	
the	state	has	expanded	the	Family	Support	Center	services	statewide.
The state still lacked any non-court programs or services 
to assist status offending (FWSN) youth.  No one, other 
than a probation officer, interacted with the children 
and their families or attempted to determine why, for 
instance, they weren’t attending school or why they 
ran away from home.  Outcomes for FWSN youth were 
poor: 52 percent of youth sent to detention in 2005 had 
previously been referred to court on a status offense
74
 
and one-third of youth referred on FWSN charges in 
2006-07 were arrested and/or referred again to court 
within six months.
75
In 2006, the legislature formed an advisory board to 
recommend plans for improving the state’s handling of 
FWSN cases. In July 2007, the state legislature adopted 
the board’s recommended plan, which called for 
non-judicial handling of virtually all FWSN cases and 
authorized a new network of Family Support Centers 
to provide targeted services for FWSN youth and their 
families.* The centers contact families within three hours 
of a case being filed and provide them with an array of 
services that include screening and assessment, crisis 
intervention, family mediation, mental health treatment, 
resiliency skill-building, educational evaluations and 
advocacy, and short-term respite care.
76
Since 2007, when the law went into effect, the FWSN 
caseload has plummeted, and the success rates of 
Connecticut’s status-offending youth have soared: 
• The number of youth detained for status offenses has 
dropped from 493 in 2006-07 to 0 in 2008-09; 
77
• The share of status offense referrals formally processed 
in court has fallen from 50 percent of those referrals 
filed in 2006 to 4.5 percent of all status offender 
referrals filed in 2010 and 2011; 
78
• Seventy percent fewer status-offending youth were 
arrested for a subsequent delinquent offense in 2008-09 
compared with two years earlier,
79
 and their behavior has 
reportedly improved both at home and in school.
80
Source: Office of Juvenile Justice 
and Delinquency Prevention, Census of 
Juveniles in Residential Placement, 
1997 – 2010. Accessed 1/5/2013 at 
http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezacjrp/
Source: Crimes Analysis Unit, CT State 
Police, CT Department of Emergency 
Services and Public Protection
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REdUCINg OVERRELIaNCE ON CONFINEMENT 
Connecticut has sharply reduced the number of youth 
confined in prison, held in detention facilities, and 
committed to the state’s training school or other 
residential facilities. 
The average daily population in detention fell from 132 
in 2006 to 71 in 2010.
81
 The detention population rose 
in 2011 as 16 year-olds entered the juvenile system, but 
remained far below the 2006 level, allowing the state 
to close one of its three detention facilities.
82
 The state 
has slashed total commitments to its training school 
and other residential facilities from 680 in 2000 to 216 
in 2011, even with the addition of 16 year-olds to the 
juvenile system.
83
 The average daily population at the 
state training school declined from 229 in 1993
84
 to 153 
in 2001,
85
 to 109 in 2011, also counting 16 year-olds.
86
 
Meanwhile, Connecticut has reduced the under-18 
population incarcerated in the state’s adult prisons from 
403 in January 2007 to 151 in July 2012.
87
The reduced number of youth in state prisons can be 
attributed in part to the Raise the Age law. In addition, 
the drop in imprisoned youth also reflects the state’s 
falling crime rates and has likely been aided by the 
dramatic reduction in commitments to the state 
training school. A growing body of research documents 
alarming recidivism among youth incarcerated in 
juvenile facilities, and several studies have found that 
juvenile incarceration increases the likelihood of future 
involvement with the justice system, particularly for 
youth with less serious offending histories.
88
Connecticut’s falling juvenile detention populations 
have been driven by several factors. The new FWSN 
(status offender) programs and policies have prevented 
hundreds of detention admissions per year and also 
resulted in fewer subsequent delinquency charges 
against status-offending youth. So too have new 
probation practices developed by the Court Support 
Services Division (CSSD) and aggressively promoted to 
line staff, including new rules requiring a supervisor’s 
approval before a youth can be detained for violating 
probation. And a widely expanded continuum of mental 
health treatment programs has reduced the number 
of days youth spend in detention awaiting appropriate 
placements.
89
 Finally, CSSD has created a new Clinical 
Coordinator position – licensed clinicians employed by 
the Judicial Branch to identify youth who suffer with 
significant mental health issues, expedite any required 
mental health assessments, and match youth to timely 
and appropriate care. CSSD data show that these Clinical 
Coordinators save the state more than $450,000 per 
year by preventing unnecessary evaluations and reducing 
lengths of stay in detention.
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The decline in the number of youth confined in the 
training school and other residential placements 
following juvenile court adjudication is the result of 
several factors:
• Fewer Youth in detention: youth detained prior  
to their court dates are three times more likely  
to be committed to custody than youth who  
remain successfully in the community during the  
pre-adjudication period.
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• Improved screening process: Commitments are now 
only allowed for high-risk youth. Youth with lower-
level offenses are placed on probation or diverted 
from the court process entirely.
• Better probation practices and programs : Despite 
handling many youth who would previously have been 
committed, new counseling and treatment programs 
have enabled Connecticut to reduce the share of 
probation youth who are re-arrested or referred to 
juvenile court by more than four percent since 2006-07.
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• Case Review Teams: Since 2005, whenever a young 
person is being considered for commitment, CSSD has 
convened a team meeting that includes the youth, 
his or her family, educators, treatment providers, and 
representatives from the Department of Children 
and Families (DCF) and CSSD to discuss the case and 
explore options to help the young person remain 
safely in the community. Of the first 597 cases 
considered by these teams (from 2005 to 2007),  
72 percent of the youth were able to avoid an  
out-of-home placement.
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• Closing gateways to delinquency and incarceration: 
Connecticut’s diminishing correctional population also 
reflects its success in closing several of the historic 
gateways to the deep end of its juvenile justice 
system. For instance, Connecticut’s FWSN reforms 
have reduced the number of status offending youth 
who lapse into delinquency. Also, the state is making 
progress in stemming the “school-to-prison pipeline,” 
reducing suspensions, expulsions, and arrests for 
low-level misbehavior in school that can substantially 
increase the odds that at-risk students drop out and 
end up in delinquency court. Finally, Connecticut is 
taking steps to improve the treatment of “cross-over” 
youth – those involved simultaneously in both the 
child welfare and delinquency court systems – who 
are also at elevated risk for commitment.
• Shorter lengths of stay: A final factor in Connecticut’s 
declining population of youth in custody has been a 
gradual reduction in the length of time youth spend 
in the state training school and other residential 
facilities. From 2002 to 2011, the average period of 
time that boys spent away from home following 
commitment declined from 304 days to 176 days. The 
length of stay for girls has fallen less dramatically 
(from 190 days to 174) over this period.
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 But, overall, 
the shorter period of confinement has been a 
significant factor in reducing the daily population of 
youth in state custody.
ESTaBLIShINg a CONTINUUM OF COMMUNITy 
pROgRaMS
In the late 1990s, DCF began experimenting with a 
new research-driven non-residential treatment model, 
Multisystemic Therapy (MST), which had produced 
encouraging results in multiple scientific trials involving 
substance-abusing, delinquent, and mentally ill teens. 
Based on favorable results in the initial projects, 
combined with mounting pressure from the Emily J. 
lawsuit to expand and improve mental health services 
for court-involved adolescents, DCF quickly ramped 
up its investment in MST for substance-abusing and 
behaviorally troubled youth. In 2003, DCF added a 
second, evidence-based, non-residential treatment 
model for high risk adolescents, Multidimensional  
Family Therapy. 
In the wake of the disappointing 2001 study showing 
alarming recidivism rates in its initial cohort of 
community-based programs for juvenile offenders, 
CSSD closed down most of the programs and began 
funding a new set of evidence-based and research-
informed community programs. CSSD has continued 
to expand and improve its network of programs, as 
has DCF. Both DCF and CSSD subsequently committed 
extensive funding to expand and improve the network 
of evidence-based community programs available for 
court-involved youth.  By 2009, the combined annual 
budget for these programs reached $39 million. 
For its highest risk youth, CSSD offers two intensive 
family-focused treatment programs, Multisystemic 
Therapy (MST),  and Intensive In-Home Child and 
Psychiatric Service (IICAPS). Combined, 628 of 
Connecticut’s serious and high-risk probation youths 
were enrolled in MST or IICAPS therapy in 2011.
95	
Other 
youth assigned to probation are served by one of CSSD’s 
12 YES! Centers around the state, which offer a mix of 
individual and/or group programming, including several 
evidence-based family treatment programs other than 
MST or IICAPS. Group programs teach such skills as anger 
management, moral reasoning, drug refusal, emotional 
regulation and self-awareness. In addition, probation 
staff has been trained to engage young people and their 
families individually, and to then identify and build on 
their goals and strengths. 
In addition to these CSSD programs, DCF provides 
evidence-based community treatment for several 
thousand more youth every year, many of them  
involved in the juvenile court system, through a new  
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Behavioral Health Partnership that is funded with a 
combination of state tax dollars and federal Medicaid 
funds. The widespread availability of effective 
community-based treatment programs has been a crucial 
factor in reducing Connecticut’s detention population 
and in diverting youth with high needs who are not a 
significant risk to public safety away from the juvenile 
justice system.
Finally, Connecticut now provides extensive programming 
for youth diverted from court. In addition to the Family 
Support Centers for FWSN youth (status offenders), 
the state has expanded its network of Juvenile Review 
Boards (JRB). These panels, comprised of community 
volunteers, police, school personnel, and/or local 
agency staff, consider the cases of youth who have 
admitted to committing minor offenses. After consulting 
with the young person and his/her family, the JRBs 
impose an appropriate sanction, which may include 
participating in substance abuse treatment or after 
school programs, writing a letter of apology to the 
victim(s) of their offense, or cleaning up, repairing  
or paying restitution for any damage they have caused.   
For many years, the JRBs operated only in the state’s 
suburbs and small towns. In 2006, the Department 
of Children and Families provided funds to launch 
JRB programs in Connecticut’s three largest cities – 
Bridgeport, Hartford, and New Haven. It has been 
providing approximately $200,000 per year to each  
city to support the JRB diversion efforts. In 2013,  
DCF will begin funding JRB programs in the remaining 
three of the six DCF regions of the state.
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Referrals to these various alternatives are guided by a 
rigorous screening and assessment process. “The system  
is designed to make sure the right kids are placed into  
the right program,” said CSSD Executive Director  
William Carbone.
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Source: Greenwood, Walsh, & Rocque, 
Implementing Proven Programs for Juvenile 
Offenders: Assessing State Progress, 
Association for the Advancement of 
Evidence-Based Practice, December 2012.
a NaTIONaL LEadER IN 
USE OF EVIdENCE-BaSEd 
FaMILy TREaTMENT
Connecticut’s adoption of evidence-based programs has outpaced most other states. 
A study released in December 2012 calculated every state’s utilization of the three 
most promising treatment models for youthful offenders – Multisystemic Therapy, 
Functional Family Therapy, and Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care – all of which 
involve intensive family therapy. The study identified Connecticut as one of five 
states that have adopted these models far faster than the rest of the nation, with 10 
or more treatment teams per million residents in the state population. (The national 
average is roughly two teams per million residents.)
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Connecticut’s Array of Evidence-Based  
Family Interventions
BRIef sTRaTegIC famIly TheRaPy®  
Brief Strategic Family Therapy (BSFT) is designed for medium-risk children and adolescents between the ages of 6 and 
17 who display or are at risk for substance abuse, conduct problems, delinquency, and other behavior problems. BSFT is 
typically delivered in 12 to 16 family sessions at home or other locations convenient to the family. The treatment aims 
to correct maladaptive family interactions,  inappropriate family alliances, and parents’ tendency to unfairly blame 
all problems on a single individual  (usually the adolescent), with the expectation that transforming how the family 
functions will help improve the youth’s behavior.   BSFT has demonstrated significantly better outcomes than other 
adolescent treatment methods in several evaluation studies dating back to 1988.
fUNCTIONal famIly TheRaPy 
Functional Family Therapy (FFT) is a highly-structured family therapy treatment model program for youth ages 11-18 
who exhibit or are at high risk for delinquency, violence,  substance use, conduct disorder, oppositional defiant 
disorder, or disruptive behavior disorder are the target population.  FFT usually requires 8-15 sessions for referred 
youth and their families, and up to 26 sessions for severe cases.  FFT therapy is typically conducted in an office 
setting but can be delivered in the home or at school and other community settings.  FFT’s effectiveness has been 
demonstrated in a long series of clinical studies dating back 40 years.  In one evaluation, 40 percent of youth randomly 
assigned to FFT avoided subsequent arrests following treatment, compared with just 7 percent of youth assigned to 
other treatments.
INTeNsIve IN-hOme ChIlD aND aDOlesCeNT PsyChIaTRIC seRvICes 
Intensive In-Home Child and Adolescent Psychiatric Services is (IICAPS) is a rigorous home-based intervention model 
for children with serious psychiatric disorders who are at high risk for placement into psychiatric or correctional 
facilities, and whose families need assistance in managing them safely in the home and community.  The IICAPS model 
was designed by adolescent treatment experts at the Yale Child Study Center to address maintain high-needs youth 
at home, rather than removing them from their families and placing them into expensive (and often ineffective) 
residential programs.  Thhe IICAPS model, is currently being evaluated in a random assignment study, but results will 
not be available until 2015.    
mUlTIDImeNsIONal famIly TheRaPy 
Multidimensional Family Therapy (MDFT) is a family-based treatment developed for adolescents with drug and 
behavior problems, and for substance abuse prevention with  early adolescents, with a heavy emphasis on family 
therapy. The treatment seeks to curb the adolescent’s substance abuse and other problem  behavior, and to improve 
overall family functioning.  MDFT has proved significantly more effective than group therapy, family discussion groups, 
and other treatment approaches in several random assignment studies.
mUlTIDImeNsIONal TReaTmeNT fOsTeR CaRe 
Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care (MDFT) is targeted  to children at the highest risk for out of home placement. 
In MDFT, youth are assigned to live with  a foster family and receive counseling for up to a year while their parents (or 
guardians) simultaneous receive counseling and parenting skills training.  At the end of the therapy process, youth are 
reunited with their biological families. MDFT has been evaluated extensively, with excellent results.  
mUlTIsysTemIC TheRaPy 
Multisystemic Therapy (MST) is an intensive  family- and community-based treatment program that focuses on 
addressing all environmental systems that impact chronic and violent  juvenile offenders -- their homes and families, 
schools and teachers, neighborhoods and friends. MST works with youth  ages  12 through 17, including youth with 
long and serious offending history  . MST clinicians go to where the child  is and are on call 24 hours a day, seven days 
a week.  MST is an evidence-based “Blueprint”  program endorsed by OJJDP, US Surgeon General and other national  
leaders in juvenile justice.
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gENdER-SpECIFIC SERVICES addEd FOR gIRLS 
Led by both DCF and CSSD, Connecticut has also 
developed an ambitious continuum of services for 
girls involved in its juvenile justice system. From 1999 
to 2002, a series of studies found that one-third of 
all juvenile cases in the state involved girls, many of 
whom had committed only status offenses or low-level 
misdemeanors and most of whom had suffered neglect, 
physical or sexual abuse, and other trauma.
98
 Despite 
their low risk to public safety, girls were regularly 
detained or committed to residential facilities often 
because the state lacked community-based treatment 
for serious mental health problems, substance abuse 
disorders, and other needs. Since 2001, when the state’s 
legislature enacted a law demanding more gender-
responsive programming, “Connecticut has made 
significant improvements to probation, detention, 
and diversion systems for girls,” a recent Georgetown 
University study declared.
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 Together DCF and CSSD 
worked with Yale University and an outside consultant 
to develop program guidelines for girls services. DCF 
has adopted gender-specific parole supervision for 
girls returning home following commitment to state 
custody. It also has created a network of private 
agencies operating group homes and other facilities for 
girls – bringing the providers together to meet monthly 
and requiring each agency to prepare periodic self-
assessments to measure how well they are adhering to 
best practice guidelines. CSSD has created specialized 
girls-only probation units and opened a number of 
shelter and community-based alternative programs 
for girls in lieu of confinement in the state’s secure 
detention facilities.
100
 Through these efforts, Connecticut 
has reduced girls’ detention admissions by 36 percent 
from fiscal years 2006 to 2012, while boys’ detention 
admissions fell 25 percent.
101
 Commitments to state 
custody also fell sharply for girls in this period.
102	
IMpROVINg CONdITIONS OF CONFINEMENT 
DeTeNTION 
Since 2002, Connecticut has continued to significantly 
improve conditions inside its detention centers. 
Specifically, improvements have been made in 
education, recreational programming, and medical 
care, as well as the physical condition of the facilities 
themselves. Connecticut has become the only state in 
the nation whose detention centers are accredited both 
by the American Correctional Association (ACA) and the 
National Commission on Correctional Health Care. The 
one serious deficiency that remained in 2002, a lack of 
appropriate mental health treatment alternatives, has 
been addressed. CSSD and DCF have strengthened their 
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mental health screening and assessment processes and 
created a substantially expanded set of community-
based programs and services. This has reduced the 
number of youth with severe mental health needs 
placed into detention, as well as the length of stay for 
those who are detained. 
TRaININg sChOOl 
The terrible conditions documented in the new 
Connecticut Juvenile Training School (CJTS) by the 
state’s Attorney General and the Child Advocate in 
2002 only grew worse in the succeeding two years. The 
situation descended into acute crisis in May 2004 when 
a weekend of unrest resulted in the restraint of 21 youths 
and sent eight staff to the hospital with injuries.
103
 Two 
months later, a new report from the Attorney General 
and Child Advocate documented 119 suicide attempts  
at the facility over the prior year, including several  
close calls.
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The state issued a temporary moratorium on admissions 
to the training school in mid-2004, and it hired a 
national expert, Don DeVore, to revamp the facility’s 
operations. DCF quickly slashed the facility’s population, 
sending many youth with less serious offenses home to 
participate in community programs. Within four months, 
the census had dropped from 150 to 72 boys. DCF also 
closed the facility’s punitive, high-security restraint 
unit where many of the worst incidents had occurred, 
instituted intensive staff training in crisis management, 
improved substance abuse counseling and behavior 
management programs as well as the facility’s education 
system, and invited families to participate in family 
counseling and to attend occasional “Family Nights” at 
the facility. 
Through these efforts, the environment at the training 
school improved.
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 In 2009, CJTS earned accreditation 
from the ACA after demonstrating 98.7 percent 
compliance with ACA’s 455 national standards and best 
practices related to programming, services, and safety. 
Despite continuing concern about its physical limitations 
(such as small cells with narrow windows), the training 
school has avoided scandal since 2005 and has gradually 
earned the respect of youth advocates. For instance, 
Connecticut Juvenile Justice Alliance Executive Director 
Abby Anderson said in a 2009 interview, “I think [CJTS is] 
doing a tremendous job with what it’s been given.” 
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Since 2009, DCF has continued to enhance programming 
at the training school. For instance, the department 
has intensified its procedures for assessing the mental 
health needs of training school residents, including a 
new screening procedure to identify those with histories 
of serious trauma, and added an array of new evidence-
based cognitive therapy programs.  It has established a 
Boys Club program at the facility both to teach life skills 
and to connect the young men to Boys & Girls Clubs and 
other supportive services in their home communities 
upon their release.
107
 And now that the facility is housing 
more 16 and 17 year-olds (due to Raise the Age), it has 
forged connections with a local community college to 
provide college level courses and vocational training 
opportunities. 
Even with the addition of older youth, safety at the 
training school continues to improve. Arrests within the 
facility have fallen from 108 in 2008 to 25 in 2012, and 
assaults on staff have also fallen during this period.
108
 
In 2013, DCF will undertake a major reconstruction 
project that will remedy longstanding problems with 
the structural design of the training school. Units 
that were previously broken into prison-like cells will 
be transformed into open recreational space, a new 
school will be created on the campus, and a new open 
housing unit will be created for younger residents. When 
the project is completed, says William Rosenbeck, 
CJTS’ superintendent, “there will be much more of 
a consistent feel of a boarding school, without the 
trappings of a prison.” 
109
STEMMINg ThE SChOOL-TO-pRISON pIpELINE
In 2007, Connecticut’s leaders began to grapple with a 
pervasive and growing problem that had long eluded 
public discussion: excessive punishment of public 
school students for routine misbehavior. Following 
the national trend toward zero tolerance school 
discipline, Connecticut schools were suspending tens 
of thousands of children every year. State Department 
of Education data for the 2005-06 school year showed 
that Connecticut schools issued 77,000 out-of-school 
suspensions, resulting in more than 250,000 missed 
school days. In one Bridgeport elementary school that 
year, a student body of 263 children was handed 391 out-
of-school suspensions.
110
 Over three in five of the 86,000 
out-of-school suspensions issued statewide in 2006-07 
were for breaking school rules, such as insubordinate 
behavior, classroom disruptions, and truancy. Just two 
percent of cases involved weapons and less than one 
percent involved violence (other than routine fighting).
111
While no statewide data from this time period were 
available on the number of Connecticut youth arrested 
in schools, this problem was clearly growing. Encouraged 
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by the availability of federal funding, Connecticut 
schools increasingly employed “school resource 
officers,” inviting local police to patrol school hallways, 
or – in some of the state’s largest municipalities – 
hiring their own school district police forces.  A study 
prepared in 2006 found that over half of all youth 
arrests in Bridgeport (more than 600 in 2003-04) took 
place at school during the school day.
112
 Combined, three 
Hartford-area school districts saw nearly 300 arrests at 
school in 2006-07. 
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In 2007, Connecticut’s legislature passed a law sharply 
limiting schools’ use of out-of-school suspensions. 
Approved with strong bi-partisan support, the law 
prohibited out-of-school suspension except for youth 
who threatened school safety or disrupted the school’s 
educational mission so severely that removal was 
essential. Even before the requirement went into effect 
in 2010, the number of out-of-school suspensions 
declined 30 percent statewide.
114
 
Connecticut leaders have launched a variety of further 
efforts to reform school discipline and reduce school 
arrests. Based on a model document developed by 
Connecticut’s Juvenile Justice Advisory Committee 
(JJAC), an office overseen by the state’s Office of Policy 
and Management that administers federal juvenile 
justice grant funds, nine Connecticut school districts 
have signed memoranda of understanding with local 
police aimed at reducing arrests at school for low-level 
misbehavior. These school-police partnerships have 
also received grant funding from the JJAC to support 
their efforts.
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 In two of these districts, local officials, 
in partnership with the Connecticut Juvenile Justice 
Alliance, launched particularly ambitious pilot programs 
in 2011 aimed at reducing school-based arrests; a third 
district initiated major changes in 2012.  At the end of 
the 2011-2012 school year arrests were down 78% at 
Manchester High School (one of the pilot sites) and 
more than 60% district-wide, and expulsions were down 
69% at the high school and 63% district-wide compared 
to figures from the prior school year.
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With support from the John D. and Catherine T. 
MacArthur Foundation’s Models for Change Initiative 
and DCF, Connecticut launched the School-Based 
Diversion Initiative (SBDI) in 2009, led by the 
Connecticut Center for Effective Practice of the Child 
Health and Development Institute (www.chdi.org).  
This model promotes mental health treatment rather 
than disciplinary or justice responses to misbehavior 
by emotionally disturbed students. SBDI began in 
two pilot sites, expanded to seven sites and launched 
two additional sites in 2012/13 with funding from the 
Connecticut Department of Education and other state 
agencies. An independent evaluation found that SBDI 
increased the use of emergency mobile psychiatric 
services, decreased the number of students arrested and 
suspended, and reduced subsequent misbehavior.
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In 2011, Connecticut juvenile courts began rejecting 
referrals involving youth arrested for very minor 
misbehavior. Of the first 221 cases the courts refused  
to prosecute, more than half involved school arrests. 
“We’re hoping schools will come up with a new 
approach,” said William Carbone, CSSD’s executive 
director. “The more children are arrested and processed 
in court for minor infractions, the more likely they’ll 
be to come back to us, and the more separated they’ll 
be from school. We don’t serve public safety by 
encouraging unnecessary referrals to court.” 
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  That same 
year CSSD began to collect and analyze data on school 
arrests for the first time, finding that 1,612 Connecticut 
students were arrested at school during the 2011-2012 
school year.
119
 CSSD is now also breaking down these 
data at the local level, and providing regular updates on 
school arrests to local coalitions striving to stem the 
school-to-prison pipeline.
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The Connecticut Department of Education has been 
training school districts to implement School-Wide 
Positive Behavioral Interventions and Supports (PBIS), a 
proven model for promoting a safe and positive learning 
climate in schools with minimal reliance on punishments 
and sanctions. The model is now being adopted in 
approximately 300 schools in 54 Connecticut school 
districts – nearly one-fifth of all schools in the state.
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In 2011, Connecticut Public Television produced and 
aired a documentary, Education vs. Incarceration, and 
organized 22 community-based forums across the state in 
partnership with the Connecticut Juvenile Justice Alliance, 
raising public awareness and generating dialogue around 
the school-to-prison issues and potential solutions.
addRESSINg RaCIaL dISpaRITIES 
Reducing the disproportionate juvenile justice contact  
of Black and Hispanic youth remains a work in progress  
in Connecticut. In fact, the state’s third comprehensive 
assessment of racial and ethnic overrepresentation, 
completed in 2009 using data from 2005 to 2007, showed 
that the situation had actually deteriorated – with several 
prior disparities growing more pronounced, and some  
new disparities appearing.  Progress toward reducing 
disparities was seen only at a handful of the many decision 
points examined.
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This lack of progress comes despite years of concerted 
effort by the Juvenile Justice Advisory Committee (JJAC).  
The JJAC has maintained a subcommittee dedicated to 
combatting racial and ethnic disparities, and commissioned 
the three comprehensive studies on racial disparities that 
have been lauded by the U.S. Office of Juvenile Justice as 
some of the most in-depth, decision-point analyses in  
the country.  
Based on data showing that police have been more likely 
to refer Black and Hispanic youth to juvenile court than 
White youth, the JJAC has conducted 76 training sessions 
on Disproportionate Minority Contact (DMC) since  
2007 involving nearly 1,400 police officers.
122
 A 2008 
 evaluation showed that this training had a lasting  
positive impact on participating officers’ knowledge  
and attitudes about youth development and issues 
related to racial disparities.
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Since 2011, the Washington, DC-based Center for  
Children’s Law and Policy (www.cclp.org) and 
Connecticut’s Center for Children’s Advocacy have 
partnered with local teams in two communities, 
Bridgeport and Hartford, to develop comprehensive 
data-driven work plans to reduce DMC and unnecessary 
processing and detention of youth generally. In the first 
phase of the project, the two communities combed 
through all available data to identify decision points 
where disparities are most prevalent and brainstorm 
possible solutions. Since then, the teams, which meet 
monthly, have begun taking concrete action on their  
local plans. 
Much of the effort has focused on school discipline, 
since Black students in Connecticut are four times as 
likely as White students to be expelled or receive an 
out-of-school suspension, while Hispanic students are 
twice as likely.
124
 Agreements have been forged between 
public schools and the police in both Bridgeport and 
Hartford to limit arrests at school for minor offenses.  
School personnel have been trained in positive behavioral 
approaches and alternatives to suspension and arrest, 
and some schools with high levels of school arrests 
have adopted the School-Based Diversion Initiative 
model.  In addition, the sites have expanded the use 
of court diversion for youth accused of misdemeanors 
and some low-level felonies, and provided training for 
police on alternatives to arrest. The Court Support 
Services Division (CSSD) has also developed a court 
date notification system (in place in several jurisdictions 
around the country for adults) to reduce the number of 
youth detained for failing to appear for scheduled court 
appointments. As of spring 2012, the sites had reduced 
juvenile court referrals of Black and Hispanic students for 
misconduct at school by 40 percent (Bridgeport) and 78 
percent (Hartford), and the overall number of Black and 
Hispanic youth referred to juvenile court has fallen in 
both sites.
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In addition, CSSD has been providing detailed DMC data 
reports to local jurisdictions on a quarterly basis –  
an important new tool for local coalitions working to 
combat persistent disparities in the juvenile system.  
The Office of Policy and Management has launched  
“JUST.Start,” a campaign to educate policymakers, 
media, and the public about disproportionate contact 
of youth of color with the juvenile justice system. After 
determining that a previous law change requiring a court 
order to detain youth accused of serious offenses had 
helped reduce racial disparities, the state enacted a new 
law in 2011 requiring a court order to detain a youth for 
any crime. The 2011 law change also requires state juvenile 
justice agencies to prepare biennial reports on their DMC 
goals and accomplishments. 
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a BETTER, MORE COST- EFFECTIVE SySTEM
Available	data	leave	no	doubt	that	public	safety	has	improved	as	a	result	of	Connecticut’s	
juvenile	justice	reforms.	The	number	of	young	people	arrested	in	Connecticut	has	declined	
substantially.	Among	children	15	and	younger,	Connecticut’s	traditional	juvenile	justice	
population,	total	arrests	have	fallen	steadily	since	2002,	with	48	percent	fewer	arrests	in	
2011	than	nine	years	earlier.	And	from	2006	to	2011	–	when	the	most	ambitious	reforms	
took	effect	–	serious	violent	crime	arrests	for	youth	under	age	16	fell	65	percent.	Among	
16	year-olds,	total	arrests	and	serious	violent	crime	arrests	fell	35	percent	and	26	percent	
respectively	from	2009	to	2011,	the	first	two	years	after	Connecticut	16	year-olds	became	
eligible	for	juvenile	court.126
In	terms	of	expense,	the	entrance	of	16	year-olds	into	the	system	has	increased	juvenile	
caseloads	less	than	expected	(22	percent	actual	vs.	40	percent	projected),	lowering	the	
state’s	expenditures	to	serve	these	youth	to	nearly	$12	million	less	than	the	amount	initially	
budgeted	for	the	2010	and	2011	fiscal	years.
Overall,	despite	the	vast	array	of	new	and	improved	programming	that	has	emerged	in	
recent	years,	Connecticut’s	spending	on	juvenile	justice	has	not	increased	over	the	past	
decade.	The	state’s	combined	expenditures	for	juvenile	justice	(including	both	the	youth	
corrections	programs	of	the	Department	of	Children	and	Families,	and	detention,	probation	
and	community	treatment	programs	operated	by	the	Court	Support	Services	Division)	
totaled	$111	million	in	the	2001-02	fiscal	year,	equivalent	to	$139	million	in	2011,	after	
adjusting	for	inflation.	In	2011-12,	Connecticut’s	juvenile	justice	expenditures	totaled	$137	
million.127	In	effect,	the	drop	in	confinement	has	fully	paid	for	the	state’s	increased	budget	for	
community-based	alternatives.	The	average	daily	cost	of	custody	at	the	Connecticut	Juvenile	
Training	School	is	$744	for	each	young	person	–	meaning	$134,000	for	a	typical	stay	of	6	
months.128	That	compares	to	$10,000	or	less	for	a	full	course	of	Multisystemic	Therapy	or	any	
of	Connecticut’s	other	community	treatment	programs.129
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Moreover,	the	reduced	treatment	and	supervision	costs	are	only	the	beginning	of	the	savings	
Connecticut	will	ultimately	realize	through	successful	juvenile	justice	reform.	Far	more	
substantial	are	the	financial	and	social	rewards	that	come	from	reducing	re-offense	rates	
(therefore	improving	public	safety),	and	boosting	successful	outcomes	for	court-involved	youth.	
As	a	result	of	Connecticut’s	shift	away	from	residential	confinement,	the	evidence	suggests	that	
many	fewer	youth	will	re-offend	and	many	more	will	go	on	to	productive	lives	in	adulthood.	
In	a	sophisticated	statistical	analysis	conducted	for	CSSD	in	2011,	the	Justice	Research	Center,	
a	Florida-based	research	organization,	found	that	“the	predicted	probability	of	recidivism	
for	youth	released	from	residential	facilities	(all	other	factors	held	constant)	was	66	percent,	
compared	to	50	percent	for	youth	with	equivalent	backgrounds	released	from	probation.” 130	
	In	other	words,	youth	committed	to	state	custody	and	confined	in	residential	facilities	costing	
hundreds	of	dollars	per	day	were	one-third	more	likely	to	re-offend	than	identical	youth	
supervised	and	treated	on	probation	for	a	fraction	of	the	cost.	
The	cost	savings	from	these	reforms	reach	well	beyond	the	juvenile	justice	system.	The	average	
costs	to	society	whenever	a	court-involved	young	person	lapses	into	a	lifetime	of	serious	and	
chronic	criminality	as	an	adult	are	estimated	at	$3.8	million,	including	wages	lost,	taxes	unpaid,	
victim	costs,	and	criminal	justice	system	expenditures.131	Indeed,	society	pays	a	heavy	price	
whenever	a	young	person	re-offends	or	proves	unable	to	transition	successfully	into	adulthood.	
By	reducing	the	number	of	children	who	experience	these	failures,	Connecticut’s	reforms	have	
clearly	been	a	financial	winner	for	its	taxpayers.	
Most importantly, reform has improved the lives of young people, their families, and their 
neighbors through gains in public safety and the increased positive contributions these youth are 
now able to make to Connecticut communities.
Source: Ryon, Early, & Hand, Juvenile 
Probation and Residential Services 
Evaluation, Justice Research Center, 
July 2011.
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JUveNIle JUsTICe RefORm IN CONNeCTICUT:  
Work in Progress
While Connecticut has made impressive strides in addressing a wide variety of flaws in its juvenile  
justice system, its leaders are the first to admit that important challenges remain, and much work still 
needs to be done:
RaCIal DIsPaRITIes 
Black and Hispanic youth make up 30 percent of Connecticut’s population ages 10 to 16. Yet they accounted for more 
than 70 percent of Connecticut youth admitted to detention in 2010 and nearly 80 percent of youth admitted to the 
Connecticut Juvenile Training School. “It troubles all of us,” says William Carbone, executive director of the Court 
Support Services Division of the Judicial Branch. Part of the problem is that youth of color enter the justice system 
at higher rates than Whites – a fact Carbone attributes to police practices, school discipline policies, and the lack of 
services and support in the low-income neighborhoods where many youth of color reside. Yet, studies consistently 
find that Connecticut’s youth of color are treated more harshly than similarly situated White youth at numerous 
decision points in the juvenile justice process. Connecticut leaders are taking steps to address these issues, but thus 
far the data show that progress has been slow.
eXCessIve DeTeNTION TImes fOR maNy gIRls, aND fOR “sTUCk” kIDs 
Unlike its predecessor, the Long Lane School, the Connecticut Juvenile Training School has never accepted girls. 
Thus, for a decade, the state has not had a state-operated secure facility for girls. Instead, it has relied upon an 
overstretched network of private facilities for girls requiring residential care, at times resulting in long wait times in 
detention. A similar problem has persisted for boys with extreme needs, , the so-called “stuck” kids, including youth 
with severe disabilities, low IQ, and acute need for treatment related to problem sexual behavior. The average wait 
time in detention for youth awaiting residential placements is more than 35 days – down just 10 percent since 2001.
132
measURINg ReCIDIvIsm 
The Department of Children and Families (DCF) tracks the number of youth who are recommitted following release 
from state custody, but unlike many states, it does not calculate the number of youth who are re-arrested or 
convicted of new offenses following release from DCF custody (including those who land in the adult justice system). 
It also does not track re-offending for at least two years following release, as recommended by the Council of 
Juvenile Correctional Administrators.
133 
Most states track recidivism more rigorously than Connecticut.
CaRe aND TReaTmeNT Of yOUTh RemaININg IN aDUlT CORReCTIONs 
The number of youth incarcerated as adults in Connecticut has declined substantially in recent years, and should fall 
further now that 17 year-olds are included in the juvenile system. Yet some youth will remain in adult facilities due  
to legal provisions mandating or allowing transfer to adult criminal court for those accused of the most serious 
crimes. In 2010, 173 juvenile cases were transferred, and as of July 2012, 151 youths under age 18 were in adult custody. 
Though the care and treatment of youth in adult prisons has improved in recent years, significant gaps remain, says 
Martha Stone, executive director of the Center for Children’s Advocacy. Also, Department of Correction data show 
that youth incarcerated in adult correctional facilities suffer alarming recidivism: 85 percent are re-arrested within 
two years of release, 62 percent are convicted of new crimes, and 70 percent return to prison on a new charge or 
parole violation.
134  
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>  CT pre-trial detention centers filled  
to twice their intended capacity. 
>  Many youth detained for status 
offenses, not crimes, and most 
of the rest are accused of only 
misdemeanors. Many suffer from 
acute mental health problems.
>  Also serious overcrowding at CT’s 
youth corrections facility, Long  
Lane training school.
>  There, too, many youth 
incarcerated for misdemeanors, 
status offenses, or probation 
violations, not serious crimes. 
  
>  No state funding for non-residential 
alternatives-to-placement/
incarceration for youth (other  
than routine probation).
>  No investment in alternatives to  
pre-trial detention for accused 
youth.
>  CT created Office of Alternative 
Sanctions in 1990, but initial 
programming only for adults,  
none for juveniles.
  
>  In detention centers, many youth 
still detained for conduct related 
to mental health and behavior 
problems, and many held months 
awaiting mental health evaluations  
or treatment.
>  In Bridgeport juvenile detention 
center in 2002, just 15% of 
detained youth are accused 
of felonies. Most accused of 
misdemeanors or rule violations.
>  At CT’s new training school, just 
one-tenth of youth confined for 
violent crimes more serious than 
simple fighting. Most held for 
criminal mischief, drug possession, 
breach of peace, disorderly 
conduct, or larceny.
>  Overall, CT has highest youth 
incarceration rate in New England.
 
		DETENTION CENTERS:  
Conditions improving following 
1997 lawsuit settlement, but…
>  In February 2002, federal judge 
finds “children still not getting 
timely and adequate mental health 
services”;
>  Crowding remains problematic, 
with as many as 20 youths sleeping 
on the floor.
  TRAINING SCHOOL:  
New training school labeled a  
“dismal failure” where “sui-
cidal children go unsupervised and 
young boys are illegally restrained 
for days on end.”
>  Severe problems in care for girls 
remaining at Long Lane, including 
weak suicide prevention and 
overreliance on seclusion.
 
>  Created a number of non-residential 
program alternatives in the late 
1990s, but..
>  a 2002 evaluation of CT’s juvenile 
alternatives-to-incarceration 
programs found that only two of 
22 programs studied significantly 
reduced recidivism.
>  Still no process to assess youth  
and ensure they are placed in 
programs or services appropriate  
to their needs.
>  Still major gaps in mental health 
services and girls programming.
 
>  Detention admissions decreased by 
more than 40% from 2002 to 2009.
>  Even after 16 year-olds entered the 
juvenile system in 2010, admissions 
remain well below 2002 level.
>  Lower populations enabled CT to 
close one of its 3 state-operated 
detention centers in 2011.
>  70% fewer residential 
commitments from 2000 to 2011 
(680 to 216), even with addition of 
16 year-olds to the juvenile system.
>  Average daily population in 
training school down 50% from 
1993 to 2011 (229 to 109) – even 
with the addition of 16 year-olds.
 
		DETENTION CENTERS:  
Significant improvements since 2002  
in conditions and programming, and  
all detention centers now accredited.
> No reports of serious or chronic 
problems with crowding, seclusion 
or harsh discipline, or substandard 
education programming in detention.
>  Enhanced services and reduced wait 
times for youth with mental health 
needs. 
  TRAINING SCHOOL: 
>  Fundamental reform effort in 2004-05 
improved behavior management at 
training school and reduced use of 
seclusion and restraint. 
>  No recent reports of serious or chronic 
problems with violence, seclusion, or 
excessive use of restraints.
  Plans in progress for major structural, 
programmatic and educational 
changes, particularly to address the 
needs of the older population. 
>  Funding for non-residential,  
family-focused treatment 
programs grew from $300,000  
in 2000 to $39 million in 2009. 
		With this budget, CT now funds  
an integrated continuum of  
high-quality programs, including:
		• non-court programs and  
 services for status offenders;
		• evidence-based therapies for  
 youth on probation;
		• behavioral health system for  
 court-involved adolescents;
		• gender-specific programs  
 for girls;
		• evidence-based aftercare  
 programs for youth returning  
 from correctional facilities.
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		DETENTION CENTERS:  
1993 lawsuit documents terrible 
conditions: 
>  severe overcrowding; 
>  children in rooms with no toilets,  
wetting themselves; 
>  widespread use of solitary confinement; 
>  no mental health treatment;
>  minimal educational programming.
  TRAINING SCHOOL:  
Conditions at Long Lane training school 
“deplorable,” says Hartford Courant,  
a “wretched warehouse”:
>  heavy reliance on seclusion;
>  frequent restraints, with many youth 
handcuffed and foot-shackled to their beds;
>  lack of effective suicide prevention 
(despite 2 suicide attempts per month).
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 STaTUS OFFENdERS  yOUTh IN ThE adULT
 JUSTICE SySTEM
 RaCIaL aNd EThNIC  
dISpaRITIES
 dISCIpLINE IN SChOOLS
>  More than 2,000 youths referred 
to court in 1992 for status offenses, 
of whom more than one-third were 
formally processed in juvenile 
court. 
>  Many of these youth were placed 
on probation for truancy, running 
away, curfew violations, and other 
non-crimes.
>  A one-day census of juveniles in 
confinement in 1991 found that 67 
status offenders were confined in 
juvenile facilities after violating 
probation rules.
  
>  CT was one of only three states  
in the U.S. that treated all 16- and 
17 year-olds as adults.
>  Thousands of 16 and 17 year-olds 
per year arrested and tried as 
adults.
>  Several hundred boys and girls 
under age 18 incarcerated in CT 
Department of Correction prisons, 
where they received little or no 
age-appropriate education or 
rehabilitative services.
  
>  CT’s juvenile justice system suffers 
with severe racial disparities.
>  Whites make up three-fourths of 
CT youth population, but less than 
25% of youth detained or admitted 
to Long Lane training school in 
1991. More than 75% of confined 
youth were Black or Hispanic.
>  The first comprehensive analysis of 
minority overrepresentation in CT’s 
juvenile justice system finds that, 
controlling for offense and other 
characteristics, Black and Hispanic 
youth are treated more harshly 
than White youth at many stages 
of the juvenile justice process.  
>  No data available on arrests or 
school suspension and expulsion 
rates during early 1990s. 
>  Virtually no schools in CT had 
school-based law enforcement 
officers.
  
>  More than 4,000 status offenders 
referred to court in 2002.
>  More than half had their cases 
formally processed in juvenile 
court.
>  Nearly 1,000 of these status-
offending youth were placed 
on court-ordered probation 
supervision.
>  Several hundred were placed in 
locked detention for violating 
probation – even though they’d 
committed no crimes.
>  No programs or services for status 
offending youth outside the 
delinquency system.
 
>  CT remained one of only three 
states in U.S. that treated all 16- 
and 17 year-olds as adults.
>  About 12,000 16 and 17 year-olds 
referred to the adult justice 
system for law violations in 
2002-03 (excluding motor vehicle 
infractions). 
>  Roughly 1,700 16 and 17 year-olds 
placed on adult probation, and 
about 300 were confined on any 
given day in state jails or prisons.
 
>  Second comprehensive analysis 
examining data from 1998-99, 
finds that racial disparities have 
improved since the early 1990s at 
several decision points, but many 
disparities still present.
>  However, a 2003 study finds that  
74 percent of confined youth 
in CT are minority, even 
though minorities were just 
15 percent of state’s youth 
population – the highest minority 
overrepresentation rate in New 
England.
 
>  Still no reliable data available on 
school arrests. 
>  Data on school suspensions and 
expulsions unavailable for 2002, 
but 41,227 CT students suspended 
at least once during 2006-07, 
resulting in more than 250,000 
school days missed.
>  Most suspensions (61%) were for 
breaking rules (insubordination, 
truancy, disruptive behavior). Just 
2% involved weapons and <1% 
involved violent crimes (other than 
routine fighting).
>  Growing number of police or 
other law enforcement workers 
stationed inside CT schools.
 
>  New law in 2005 prohibits detention 
of status offenders for violating 
probation or court order.
>  New law in 2007 creates Family 
Support Centers to work with status 
offenders and their families outside 
the delinquency court system.
>  As a result, number of status 
offenders detained fell from 493  
to 0.
>  Status offense case referrals down 
from 4,560 in 2006 to 2,475 in 2009.
>  Share of status offender cases 
formally processed in court reduced 
from 50% of cases in 2006-07 to 
under 5%.
>  Far greater success for status 
offenders: 70% fewer status 
offenders re-arrested, and improved 
behavior documented at home and 
in school.
>  Enacted historic “Raise the Age” 
legislation in 2007.
>  From Jan. 1, 2010 (when the law 
went into effect for 16 year-olds) 
and June 30, 2012, 8,325 CT 16 
year-olds avoided prosecution and 
punishment as adults. 
>  17 year-olds became eligible for 
juvenile court on July 1, 2012.
>  Allowing 16 year-olds into juvenile 
system increased caseloads far less 
than expected, saving $12 million 
from amounts initially budgeted  
in 2010 and 2011 fiscal years.
>  16 year-olds achieving better 
success and lower recidivism in 
juvenile system than youth 15-and-
under.
>  17-and-under population in CT 
adult prisons declined from 403 in 
January 2007 to 151 in July 2012. 
>  Third analysis of minority 
representation, examining data 
from 2006-07, finds little progress. 
In fact, some disparities growing.
>  However, CT has launched several 
efforts since 2007 to combat 
disparities:
•  Provided training for nearly 
1,400 police officers statewide 
to eliminate racial disparities in 
treatment of youth; 
•  Pilot projects in Bridgeport and 
Hartford substantially have 
reduced school arrests for Black 
and Hispanic youth, and reduced 
total arrest rates for Black and 
Hispanic youth as well; 
•  Local breakdowns of racial/
ethnic disparities now 
calculated quarterly by the 
state to support local efforts 
to combat disproportionate 
treatment.
>  In 2007, CT legislature passes  
law prohibiting out-of-school 
suspensions for minor misconduct. 
>  CT’s out-of-school suspension rate 
reduced 30% since 2007.
>  In 2011, state juvenile probation 
department begins refusing to  
process some cases for truancy and 
other minor school misbehavior.  
Of the first 221 cases rejected, more 
than half involved arrests at school.
>  Schools and police in nine jurisdictions 
have signed agreements to limit  
school arrests and pilot efforts  
to reduce arrests and improve  
discipline policies underway in other  
CT school districts. 
>  In one district (Manchester), school 
arrests and expulsions both declined 
more than 60 percent district-wide.
>  CT Judicial Branch began calculating  
and reporting school-based arrests  
for the first time. 
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The contrast between the Connecticut juvenile justice system today and the deficient 
and scandal-plagued system of 10 and 20 years ago could not be sharper. Connecticut’s 
improvements have quickly thrust the state into a position of national leadership on juvenile 
justice. Shay Bilchik, who directed the federal Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 
Prevention in the 1990’s and now leads the Center for Juvenile Justice Reform at Georgetown 
University, says that most states are not taking advantage of new practices and research  
findings about what works in juvenile justice that could dramatically improve outcomes and 
cost-effectiveness. 
“As a nation, we’re really not there yet,” said Bilchik, “but we have early adopters who are  
putting to use the knowledge base we have now.” Citing Connecticut as a charter member of 
that select group, Bilchik adds, “We need to celebrate that small cadre of states that are doing 
things right.” 135 
What were the core elements underlying Connecticut’s progress in reform? While there were  
many critical developments and pivotal players in Connecticut’s reform story, it is impossible to 
imagine the dramatic changes occurring without the following: 
• Formation of the Connecticut Juvenile Justice Alliance and the coalescing of advocates  
statewide;
• Commitment by the state to using evidence-based treatment models and other promising  
practices validated by research;
• A comprehensive statewide juvenile justice strategic planning process that helped forge  
a new interagency consensus in favor of working with children and their families within  
their homes and communities, identifying their risks and addressing their needs – while  
removing  youth from their homes only as a last resort;
• Philanthropic support that provided funding at pivotal moments for advocates and reforms; 
• Effective litigation that gave policymakers the push they needed to start and sustain  
reform  efforts. 
1 . CReaTINg a vOICe fOR JUveNIle  
JUsTICe RefORm: The CONNeCTICUT 
JUveNIle JUsTICe allIaNCe  
While Connecticut had a number of organizations 
promoting the needs of all children, there was no group 
with a laser-like focus on juvenile justice reform. In late 
2001, the Connecticut Juvenile Justice Alliance (Alliance) 
was conceived to fill that void under the leadership of 
four organizations: Connecticut Voices for Children, 
a statewide policy advocacy organization; the Center 
for Children’s Advocacy, a statewide legal services and 
advocacy organization; RYASAP, the youth advocacy 
organization in Bridgeport; and The Tow Foundation, a 
private family philanthropy. 
The Alliance created a new forum for advocates and 
concerned leaders, and it brought an organizational 
capacity to Connecticut’s juvenile justice reform 
movement.  The coalition, with a steering committee 
made up of advocacy agencies, service providers, 
parent groups, the state’s Child Advocate, and other 
stakeholders, created an agenda for reform that 
had previously been absent.  As the Alliance added 
dedicated staff, it built capacity to recruit and organize 
volunteers; engage the media; provide support for public 
events; and conduct policy research, data analysis, and 
strategic planning for system reform efforts.
The Alliance elevated the conversation around juvenile 
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justice through a series of annual forums in Hartford 
that featured keynote addresses by national experts 
and panel discussions with state leaders.  These forums 
attracted hundreds of policymakers, stakeholders and 
families.  The Alliance helped to convince leaders in 
the Department of Children and Families and the Court 
Support Services Division in 2004 to jointly undertake a 
juvenile justice strategic planning process. This process 
is widely praised today as a key step toward building a 
shared vision for juvenile justice in the state. 
By 2006, the Alliance had solidified its standing as a 
powerful player in Connecticut and emerged as the 
driving force behind the state’s historic “Raise the 
Age” legislation. “The Juvenile Justice Alliance was 
absolutely central to the reform effort” for raising the 
age, according to Liz Ryan, executive director of the 
Campaign for Youth Justice in Washington, D.C. “They 
brought together the different stakeholders and created 
a plan that all could get behind, and they had the 
discipline to stick with it.
136
“The Alliance identified and cultivated legislative 
champions to take this on,” Ryan added, “not just 
members associated with the Judiciary Committee, but 
also the money committee, Appropriations.” 
137
 During 
the heat of the legislative debates and in other debates 
since, the Alliance became a force multiplier for state 
legislators and other allies, providing talking points, 
mobilizing volunteers, and filling the room at hearings 
and other high profile events. The Alliance brought 
in national experts and Connecticut youth and their 
families, prepping them to help ensure their testimony 
would make the issue real for legislators, systems 
administrators and other opinion leaders. All this 
attracted steady media attention.
State Representative Toni Walker of New Haven, a 
dedicated legislative champion for Raise the Age, recalls 
that the Alliance was crucial to her efforts.  “Being a 
part-time legislator makes it really difficult; you can’t 
keep track of all the intricate details [of legislation] on 
your own.  I really depended on [the advocates] to tell 
me what’s going on and what needed to be done. We all 
worked well together.” 
138
The Alliance also excelled at grassroots mobilizing. A 
postcard campaign resulted in 4,000 messages to state 
legislators encouraging them to raise the age. An event 
at the Capitol brought over 350 young people, 
family members, and other advocates clad in orange 
“Raise the Age” t-shirts to the statehouse. The Alliance 
has remained a powerful voice in state policy debates, 
teaming up regularly with legislative allies to beat back 
calls to delay implementation of Raise the Age; to push 
for reduction of out-of-school suspensions, expulsions 
and school-based arrests; to address racial disparities, 
and to help mobilize and support local coalitions 
created under the state’s Juvenile Justice Strategic Plan 
– known as Local Interagency Service Teams (LISTS) - 
working on juvenile justice issues around the state.
2 . DOINg whaT wORks: emBRaCINg 
evIDeNCe-BaseD aND OUTCOmes-fOCUseD 
PRaCTICes 
As a 20-year veteran working inside Connecticut’s 
juvenile justice system, Catherine Foley Geib concurs 
that the Alliance has been a key contributor to reform.
“The advocates bring us an outside perspective,” 
remarked Foley Geib, currently the Manager of Clinical 
and Educational Services in the Judicial Branch’s Court 
Support Services Division (CSSD). “They call our 
attention to issues that we can’t see, that deserve our 
attention, and they hold us accountable.”  But, Foley 
Geib added, “Even with the best advocacy, if you don’t 
have a functional state government, a functional  agency, 
these great ideas aren’t going to get implemented well.”
Fortunately, CT’s JJ system is widely praised today as 
a top-notch provider of supervision and treatment 
services for court involved youth.  CSSD and its sister 
“Being a part-time legislator 
makes it really difficult; 
you can’t keep track of all 
the intricate details [of 
legislation] on your own.    
I really depended on [the 
advocates] to tell me  
what’s going on and what 
needed to be done. we all 
worked well together. ”  – CT State Rep. Toni Walker
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agency, the Department of Children and Family 
Services (DCF), have worked together closely in recent 
years to make Connecticut a national leader in in the 
use of evidence-based and data-driven programming 
for youthful offenders. 
That wasn’t always the case. According to Peter 
Panzarella, the longtime director of DCF’s adolescent 
substance programs before retiring in 2012, “when 
we looked at adolescent behavioral health services 
in Connecticut in the mid-1990s, we were heavily 
oriented to institutional services [i.e., residential 
treatment facilities], which were very expensive 
and not terribly effective. We were very light on 
community  services.” 
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 In 1997, Panzarella secured 
a federal grant to establish the state’s first family-
focused, evidence-based treatment program for 
adolescents, Multisystemic Therapy (MST), which had 
proven highly effective in a series of controlled clinical 
trials. When the initial pilot project showed promising 
results, DCF added additional MST treatment teams 
around the state and began investing in a second 
home-based treatment model, Multidimensional 
Family Therapy, aimed at youth with deep-seeded 
family problems.  Today, DCF offers these and other 
evidence-based family therapy programs to thousands 
of youth each year in its child welfare, behavioral 
health, and juvenile justice programs.
In addition, DCF has embraced  evidence-based 
practices in other aspects of its work with justice- 
involved youth. At the training school, DCF has 
provided intensive in-service training for its clinical 
staff and introduced  a number of proven cognitive- 
behavioral models for helping youth improve their 
perspective-taking  and decision-making skills, as well 
as state-of-the-art substance abuse treatment. DCF 
carefully  screens all youth for mental and behavioral 
health issues, and it provides specialized treatment  
groups for those with a history of serious trauma.  
DCF has developed an elaborate quality  assurance 
process to ensure that private provider  agencies 
adhere to best practice in the care and treatment of 
girls in state custody.
CSSD took a bit longer to embrace the evidence-based 
models.  The agency was created in 1998 through 
the merger of several previously independent units, 
including juvenile probation, adult probation, juvenile 
 ageNTs fOR ChaNge:  
Legislators
At key moments in the effort to reform Connecticut’s 
juvenile justice system, members of the state legislature 
have stepped forward to provide timely and consistent 
leadership. 
•  In the mid-1990s, at a time when fear of adolescent crime was 
rising and states across the nation were enacting reactive, get-
tough juvenile justice laws, Connecticut’s legislators took a more 
measured and farsighted approach. Led by Michael Lawlor, the 
new co-chair of the Judiciary Committee, the legislators crafted 
an elaborate juvenile reform law in 1995 that addressed some 
of the concerns voiced by law-and-order conservatives, such as 
easing confidentiality restrictions and allowing state prosecutors 
to transfer serious cases to adult court (subject to judicial 
review). However, most of the new provisions in the law – and 
millions in new funding – were devoted to creating the state’s 
first community-based supervision and treatment programs for 
court-involved youth.
•  As the Raise the Age campaign was getting underway in 2005, 
State Representative Toni Walker and State Senator Toni Harp, 
both of New Haven, stepped forward as determined and skillful 
legislative champions. Walker and Harp served as co-chairs 
of the Juvenile Jurisdiction Planning and Implementation 
Committee that hashed out the details of the Raise the Age 
legislation prior to the 2007 legislative session, and Walker 
co-chaired the follow-up committee that monitored the 
law’s implementation through Fall 2012. During the legislative 
battles, Walker and Harp worked closely with advocates to 
build legislative momentum, answer members’ policy concerns, 
and demonstrate the proposal’s deep and widespread support 
among both Connecticut residents and national policy experts. 
The “Two Toni’s” (as they are known) serve as co-chairs of the 
legislature’s powerful Appropriations Committee. From these 
positions, they were able to repel opponents’ efforts to delay 
implementation of Raise the Age and to ensure continued 
adequate funding for juvenile justice reform initiatives at a time 
of state budget cuts.
•  Other legislators have also made crucial contributions to reform 
in Connecticut. For instance, State Representative Gail Hamm of 
Middletown was a passionate advocate for reforming the state’s 
treatment of status offenders in 2005-2007. “You would not 
have had the status offender reform without Gail Hamm,” said 
the state’s chief juvenile defender, Christine Rapillo. “She was 
relentless, and she was smart enough to get it written into law 
that there would be a task force [to address the issue].” 
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detention, and an office of alternative sanctions. At 
the outset, CSSD inherited a large number of new 
community-based treatment programs for youth.  
However, most of these programs lacked any basis 
in theory or research, and CSSD was ill prepared to 
measure results or carefully assess youth to figure  
out which programs might best suit their needs.  
“We didn’t have a lot of research and evidence on 
how to do this,” said the division’s Executive Director 
William Carbone.
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CSSD immediately began to build its information 
systems. But urgency for change – in fact, the entire 
direction of the division’s programming for system- 
involved youth – shifted dramatically in 2001 and 
2002 thanks to two catalytic events
The first came in 2001 when Thomas White, then 
CSSD’s Director of Operations, led a staff team to 
Canada to meet with a group of Carleton University 
scholars who had developed an exciting new body 
of research. Until the 1980s, criminologists had no 
clear evidence that any particular rehabilitation 
strategy for youth worked better than any other. Then 
scholars began producing evidence that a handful of 
model intervention programs outperformed standard 
practices in random trials, as long as their complex 
models were followed faithfully. 
The Canadians’ new research showed that certain 
types of programs consistently worked better than 
other types, without the caveat that they needed to 
follow any particular model. Inspired by this research, 
CSSD quickly established a Center for Best Practices to 
spearhead an agency-wide campaign to align all of its 
programming with available research.
The second catalyst was the state-sponsored 
outcomes evaluation of CSSD’s existing alternative 
programs by the Connecticut Policy and Economic 
Council (CPEC), which found that the programs 
were largely ineffective. Youth served by alternative 
programs in 1999 had higher recidivism rates than 
youth in 1994 who did not participate in any program. 
Just two of the 22 programs examined reliably reduced 
recidivism.
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The CPEC study “created a crisis,” said Julie Revaz,  
who oversees CSSD’s best practices center.
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 Within  
18 months, the agency scrapped virtually all of its 
existing programs, cancelling $7.5 million in contracts.  
 ageNTs fOR ChaNge:  
Judges
Given their position and the deference they are typically 
shown in the state’s political culture, it’s safe to say that 
no major reforms were likely to emerge without at least 
tacit support from the Judiciary. Fortunately, Connecticut 
judges have provided much more than that – often 
becoming strong advocates for the reform process. 
•  Judge Christine Keller, the state’s Chief Administrative Judge 
for Juvenile Matters from 2007 to 2012, has been described as 
a behind-the-scenes crusader for judicial reform. Keller, who 
also served as the state’s chief juvenile judge from 1997 to 2002, 
played a key role in forging consensus on the coordinating 
committee that crafted recommendations for Raise the Age 
legislation in 2006 and 2007. From 2010 to 2012, Keller used 
her position to bring attention to excessive school arrests for 
low-level misbehavior. She worked closely with the Connecticut 
Juvenile Justice Alliance to convene a 2010 training conference 
for local teams from across the state to hear about innovative 
school-police partnerships to limit student arrests for misbehavior 
on school grounds. Since then, Keller has encouraged other 
judges to get involved in the issue. “A lot of the judges are really 
coming out of their comfort zones,” Keller says. “They’re going to 
committee meetings; they’re going to school boards.”
•  Judge Barbara Quinn, Keller’s immediate predecessor as the 
state’s chief juvenile judge, has also been a pivotal supporter of 
juvenile justice reforms. Quinn served on the drafting committee 
of the advisory board that developed the Family With Service 
Needs (FWSN or status offender) reform legislation in 2006. 
•  Judge William Lavery, Connecticut’s chief court administrator in 
2006 and 2007, also played a key role in the passage of Raise the 
Age, helping combat objections that the changes would create 
overwhelming costs and logistical challenges. While Lavery was 
also concerned about the costs and complications that raising 
the age would entail, ultimately he was persuaded by the data 
showing that trying all 16 and 17 year-olds as adults would have 
negative impacts on youth and public safety, as well as the 
detailed planning undertaken by reformers and the widespread 
support for the change among top leaders in state government. 
Lavery testified in support of the legislation in March 2007,  
and his testimony proved a turning point in breaking down 
resistance to the law. 
•  Judge Richard Chatigny, the federal district court judge who 
oversaw the Emily J. lawsuit over conditions and services in 
Connecticut’s juvenile detention system, also provided crucial 
leadership. According to litigator Martha Stone, Chatigny  
injected himself into the process at several points and pressed 
the parties to reach agreement on reforms, not only to correct 
physical conditions, but also to improve mental health  
screening and treatment and make appropriate alternatives  
to detention available. 
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In 2003, the division began statewide funding for  
one evidence-based treatment model, Multisystemic 
Therapy (MST), hiring enough therapists to serve 675 
youths per year. Since then, CSSD has expanded MST 
services and added a number of other evidence-based 
model programs, nearly all of which are home-based  
and family-focused rather than residential. They are 
all based on research showing that these types of 
therapeutic interventions yield far better results than 
standard probation supervision, and equal or better 
results than far more expensive residential confinement 
or treatment programs.
“It would have been easier to work with those [existing] 
programs and try to make them better,” said Carbone,
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“but we replaced them” 
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 with proven models.
In addition to instituting evidence-based programs, CSSD 
also developed a scientifically validated assessment 
tool to determine the needs of individual youth, and 
a sophisticated management information system to 
track results and determine how well programs were 
working and for which youth. Prior to these investments, 
explained Carbone, “we knew how many youth we were 
serving, in terms of a headcount, but we had no data  
at all on how well they were doing, how timely our 
services were, or what the reasons were for failures or 
probation violations.” 
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To Shay Bilchik, this commitment to evidence makes 
Connecticut stand out among states as a leader in 
juvenile justice: “They are heavily invested in data, and 
they’ve really used data in their day-to-day management 
of the system…They’ve really spent time developing 
evidence-based programs.” 
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Leaders throughout Connecticut share similar respect 
for the agency. “CSSD is a high-functioning agency,” said 
Rep. Toni Walker, a champion of juvenile justice reform 
in Connecticut’s legislature.
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 Adds Christine Rapillo,  
the state’s chief juvenile public defender, “Bill Carbone  
is so good at understanding that you’ve got to prove 
what works.” 
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3 . BUIlDINg a CONseNsUs: The 
CONNeCTICUT JUveNIle JUsTICe 
sTRaTegIC PlaN 
A third critical step for Connecticut’s juvenile justice 
reform efforts began in 2004, when advocates affiliated 
with the Connecticut Juvenile Justice Alliance helped 
to convince leaders in CSSD and DCF to undertake a 
strategic planning process for the state’s juvenile  
justice system. 
By 2004, the two agencies had begun working more 
closely together, thanks to their status as joint 
defendants in the ongoing Emily J. lawsuit over 
conditions in the state-operated detention centers and 
the lack of community alternatives for court-involved 
youth. Rather than resisting, leaders of both agencies 
embraced the idea of a statewide juvenile justice 
strategic plan, which quickly grew into an immense and 
pivotally important undertaking. 
Facilitated by experts from the Child Welfare League 
of America with funding support from the state 
legislature, the process involved a hundred stakeholders 
representing various levels of staff from state agencies, 
the courts, community and family groups, philanthropy, 
and academic experts. The effort started with 
community listening sessions where more than 450 
children and families shared their experiences with the 
juvenile justice system, followed by extensive strategy 
work by three committees (each with several active 
subcommittees).
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 General sessions to discuss the overall 
progress of the various committees were well-attended 
throughout the nine-month process. 
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Published in August 2006, the resulting Juvenile Justice 
Strategic Plan embodied a progressive new consensus for 
the state that was shared by advocates, public agency 
leaders, and even the law enforcement community. It 
helped pave the way for the rapid adoption of major 
reforms that have continued from 2007 to the present day. 
A third critical step for Connecticut’s juvenile justice 
reform efforts began in 2004, when advocates affiliated 
“Connecticut’s innovative 
spirit and commitment 
to high quality practice 
and system improvement 
ensure the state’s role as 
one of the most advanced 
juvenile justice systems in 
the country. ”   – Shay Bilchik, Georgetown Center for  
 Juvenile Justice Reform
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with the Connecticut Juvenile Justice Alliance (Alliance) 
helped to convince leaders in CSSD and DCF to 
undertake a strategic planning process for the state’s 
juvenile justice system. 
By that time, both CSSD and DCF were heartily 
embracing evidence-based treatment models and 
other data-driven best practices. Yet severe problems 
remained in the state’s treatment of troubled and 
delinquent youth, and the state’s juvenile justice system 
still lacked a unified and coherent strategy.  By 2004, 
the two agencies had begun working more closely 
together, thanks to their status as joint defendants in the 
ongoing Emily J. lawsuit over conditions in the state-
operated detention centers and the lack of community 
alternatives for court-involved youth. Recognizing 
the need for a more cohesive system, leaders of both 
agencies embraced the idea of a statewide juvenile 
justice strategic plan, which quickly grew into an 
immense and pivotally important undertaking. 
Specifically, the Strategic Plan endorsed a number 
of ambitious goals long sought by the advocacy 
community, such as providing 16- and 17 year-olds 
with age-appropriate services in the juvenile justice 
system and diverting status offending youth from 
court whenever possible. The plan advocated vigorous 
action to address racial disparities and disproportionate 
minority contact in the juvenile system, and it 
highlighted the importance of enhancing community-
based services to divert youth from juvenile court 
and from the juvenile corrections system. In addition, 
the Strategic Plan drew attention to the excessive 
reliance on suspensions and expulsions for misbehavior 
in schools – an issue that had received little notice 
previously – advocating instead for alternative discipline 
strategies to keep youth in school. 
Along with setting broad goals for reform, the Strategic 
Plan outlined improvements to ensure the juvenile 
system was evidence-based, data-driven, competently 
staffed, and outcomes-oriented. Among its major 
recommendations, the Strategic Plan called for 
systematic use of reliable screening tools to ensure that 
youth were assigned to programs and services matched 
to their individual needs and risks, and it stressed the 
need for rapid adoption of evidence-based programs 
and treatment strategies.  It called for improved 
coordination and information-sharing between CSSD 
and DCF, as well as new mechanisms to ensure greater 
coordination across the entire range of agencies and 
professionals involved in the lives of delinquent youth 
(including educators and mental health providers). 
Also, the plan advocated for major investments in staff 
training and workforce development so that front-line 
workers in probation, community treatment programs, 
and residential facilities were culturally competent  
and well-versed in effective practices for working with 
high-risk youth.
The Strategic Plan created a number of new mechanisms 
to foster continuing attention to juvenile justice 
and create an ongoing platform to promote further 
improvements in the state’s juvenile system. It called 
for the creation of Local Interagency Services Teams (or 
LISTs) in every juvenile court district in the state. These 
LISTs involve a cross-section of community leaders 
concerned with juvenile justice who meet regularly 
to identify and discuss local issues and challenges and 
inform state officials about gaps or problems in state 
policies and programs that affect their communities. 
The plan also created an “Executive Implementation 
Team” to oversee and monitor the state’s efforts to 
implement the Strategic Plan. This oversight body, which 
has continued to meet quarterly since 2006, has helped 
ensure that state leaders retain their focus and follow 
through on the Strategic Plan recommendations, and 
it has created a high-level forum for leaders to discuss 
emerging issues and challenges. 
“Connecticut’s 
accomplishments reflect 
the essential elements 
of effective juvenile 
justice reform: dedicated 
leadership, stakeholder 
collaboration, use of data 
to drive decisions, and a 
shared belief in serving 
youth and families in their 
own communities.”   – Mark Soler, Center for Children’s Law and Policy
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Finally, the Strategic Plan committed state leaders 
to a new Results-Based Accountability (RBA) system 
that holds state agencies accountable for achieving 
specific and quantifiable performance goals related 
to juvenile justice, and then monitoring progress 
over time. For instance, under the RBA process, the 
juvenile probation department reports its progress 
regularly on a series of measures tied to common 
sense questions such as: “how much did we do?” 
(tracking new juvenile court intake cases annually); 
“how well did we do?” (the share of probation youth 
served in treatment programs appropriate to their 
individual risks and needs); “how well did we do it?” 
(percentage of youth taken into custody for violating 
probation rules); and “is anyone better off?” (both 
the re-arrest rates of youth served by probation  
and the number of youth committed to state 
custody annually).  
“I firmly believe that without a shared vision and a 
plan to execute it with concrete goals and measures, 
Connecticut’s progress on juvenile justice reform 
would not have been anywhere near as widespread 
and comprehensive as it has been,” said Emily Tow 
Jackson, executive director of The Tow Foundation, 
a co-founder of the Connecticut Juvenile Justice 
Alliance. “I feel the [Strategic Plan] paved the way for 
future reforms and legislative wins.” 
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Anne McIntyre Lahner, who served as the 
Department of Children and Families’ point person 
on the Strategic Plan, identifies the state’s attitudinal 
shift as the most important impact of the process. “It 
changed our whole understanding of who these kids 
are,” said McIntyre Lahner. “We looked deeply at the 
underlying significant needs of the juvenile justice 
kids. Many of them have suffered trauma or abuse; 
a lot of them have been through our child welfare 
system, or have serious mental health problems. This 
new shared understanding of who the kids are and 
what they need, it really changed the conversation.” 
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4 . PROvIDINg a Base Of sUPPORT: The 
TOw fOUNDaTION aND OTheRs COmmIT 
TO JUveNIle JUsTICe RefORm 
A fourth key catalyst for Connecticut’s impressive 
strides in juvenile justice reform has been the 
emergence of steady and substantial philanthropic 
 ageNTs fOR ChaNge:  
Advocates and  
the Media
CeNTeR fOR ChIlDReN’s aDvOCaCy 
A founding partner of the Connecticut Juvenile Justice Alliance, 
the Center filed the Emily J. lawsuit in 1993.  Led by Martha Stone 
since its inception, the Center has initiated litigation related to 
numerous child welfare and juvenile justice policies and practices 
that has helped to drive important reforms in both systems and 
identified emerging issues, such as youth homelessness, trafficking 
and the needs of girls. 
CONNeCTICUT vOICes fOR ChIlDReN 
A founding partner of the Connecticut Juvenile Justice Alliance, 
Voices produced juvenile justice research vital to reform efforts 
and took the lead in raising awareness of excessive school 
suspensions and school-based arrests. 
The RegIONal yOUTh aDUlT sOCIal  
aCTION PaRTNeRshIP (RyasaP) 
A local youth advocacy organization in Bridgeport and founding 
partner of the Connecticut Juvenile Justice Alliance. RYASAP 
continues to provide a home to the Alliance and serve as its 
fiscal agent. RYASAP’s longtime executive director, Robert 
Francis, has been co-chair of the Alliance steering committee 
since it was founded. In 2000, RYASAP convened the Greater 
Bridgeport Juvenile Justice Task Force, bringing local leaders and 
advocates together on a regular basis to identify and address 
concerns related to juvenile justice – a model that has now been 
replicated statewide in the form of Local Interagency Service 
Teams in every juvenile court district.
PaReNTs aND famIlIes  
Families have consistently injected their perspective into policy 
discussions around juvenile justice. Through grassroots organizing 
and state-level advocacy, FAVOR, Inc., a statewide family advocacy 
organization led by Hal Gibber, that is focused on behavioral 
and mental health services for children, and African Caribbean 
American Parents of Children with Disabilities (AFCAMP) have 
helped keep parents’ voices at the center of reform efforts 
statewide and hold system leaders accountable. Longtime 
AFCAMP Executive Director, Merva Jackson, who passed away 
in 2012, served on the Executive Implementation Team for the 
state Juvenile Justice Strategic Plan and participated on many of 
the task forces and legislative committees that have shaped key 
reforms in Connecticut.
The meDIa 
The media has played a crucial role by shining a light on the  
need for reforms. Examples include reporter Colin Poitras, who 
wrote more than 300 news stories about juvenile justice for the 
Hartford Courant between 1994 and 2008 and the Connecticut Mirror, 
an online news service that covers state government; Connecticut 
Public Television, which aired the important documentary, 
Education vs. Incarceration, in 2011; and Youth Rights Media, a 
New Haven nonprofit organization whose youth members have 
produced influential documentaries since 2002 on juvenile justice 
and related topics.
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support. Since the late 1990s, The Tow Foundation, 
based in New Canaan, has provided more than 300 
grants totaling $12 million to support juvenile justice 
reform efforts statewide, including direct services, 
research and advocacy. Other foundations, both 
within and outside Connecticut, have also provided 
invaluable assistance to juvenile justice advocates, 
innovators, and reformers. Within the state, the 
Connecticut Health Foundation has awarded dozens 
of grants to support juvenile justice and adolescent 
mental health projects and the Edward S. Moore 
Family Foundation and Hartford Foundation for 
Public Giving have also contributed significantly. In 
addition, national funders, such as Public Welfare 
Foundation, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur 
Foundation, Open Society Foundations, and the 
JEHT Foundation, have all provided important 
support for Connecticut juvenile justice reform 
projects, often leveraged by local foundation 
investments. In addition, using funds from a variety 
of national foundations, the Campaign for Youth 
Justice provided substantial financing to support 
the Connecticut Juvenile Justice Alliance’s successful 
Raise the Age campaign.
Viewed in perspective, the total value of philanthropic 
contributions to juvenile justice reform from Tow 
and other foundations remain modest – vastly 
overshadowed by the state’s annual spending  
for juvenile justice facilities, programs, and services, 
which exceeds $137 million per year. 
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 Yet, the  
steady and consistent availability of even this  
limited funding has been critical, reinforcing and 
rewarding the efforts of advocates and youth-serving 
agencies to continue testing new approaches and 
pushing for change.
“Connecticut is unusual in that we have a foundation 
that has made juvenile justice a key priority,” 
explained Connecticut Juvenile Justice Alliance 
Executive Director Abby Anderson. “This is not a 
population that gets a lot of attention from anyone, 
especially not from people with money. 
“[The consistent philanthropic support] gives our 
work a strong base, a spine, so we always know 
there’s something we can build on,” Anderson added. 
“In states that don’t have a foundation like Tow –  
 ageNTs fOR ChaNge:  
State Partners
JUveNIle DefeNDeRs 
The state’s chief juvenile defender, Christine Rapillo, worked to 
protect children’s constitutional rights throughout the reform 
process, including serving on several state committees. Rapillo 
serves as co-chair of the Alliance’s steering committee and plays 
a key role in its oversight of Connecticut’s Raise the Age law. She 
also sits on the state’s Juvenile Justice Advisory Committee and 
the U.S. Department of Justice’s Federal Advisory Committee on 
Juvenile Justice. 
JUveNIle PROseCUTORs    
The state’s chief juvenile prosecutor, Francis Carino, sat on many 
of the planning committees charged with framing major reforms 
representing the perspective of law enforcement and the issues 
around public safety. Carino has volunteered his time to design 
and deliver trainings to help court and law enforcement personnel 
implement new reform laws and work with local Juvenile Review 
Boards to help establish effective diversion programs. 
JUveNIle JUsTICe aDvIsORy COmmITTee 
(JJaC) 
Housed in the Office of Policy and Management (OPM), the JJAC 
has long played a key role in focusing attention on crucial issues 
in juvenile justice. Led by Valerie LaMotte, the JJAC sponsored 
intensive analyses of disproportionate treatment of youth of color 
in the state’s justice system and trained nearly 1,400 police officers 
on appropriate handling of juvenile cases. The JJAC also allocates 
federal juvenile justice resources to a variety of reform and system 
improvement projects every year.
CeNTeR fOR effeCTIve PRaCTICe 
The Connecticut  Center for Effective Practice of the Child Health 
and Development Institute, led first by Dr. Janet Williams  and 
currently by Dr. Robert Franks, was created in 2001 to improve 
Connecticut’s mental health and juvenile justice systems. It has 
published two major reports that recommended practice changes 
in mental  health  service delivery; evaluated and supported 
replication of MST programs statewide; published a juvenile 
justice system guidebook for parents and caregivers of children   
in the system; and developed and implemented the School- Based 
Diversion Initiative (SBDI) targeting at risk youth vulnerable to 
school-based arrest.  The Center continues to train hundreds 
of DCF and  CSSD staff annually in best practices related to 
adolescent development, evidence-based treatment, and trauma-
focused services for youth.
lOCal law eNfORCemeNT  
Leaders around the state, such as Bridgeport Police Chief Joseph 
Gaudett, have actively worked with the education and judicial 
systems to help reduce school arrests and support training of 
officers on how to minimize racial and ethnic disparities in their 
handling of juvenile cases.
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a funder which has made a long-term commitment to 
the issue – it’s hard to get people involved  
[in juvenile justice reform]. A foundation can help bring 
people to the table.  It can make it safe to  
do the work.” 
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5 . aCCeleRaTINg RefORm ThROUgh 
lITIgaTION  
Over the past four decades, lawsuits have made a 
crucial difference in addressing abuses and improving 
conditions of confinement in many states. However, 
litigation has often been effective as a fulcrum for deep 
and sustained reforms, particularly in jurisdictions where 
system leaders view litigation as an obligation to be met 
with minimalistic corrective action plans and legalistic 
compliance rather than seeing it as a call to action  
to revamp policies and practices that are ineffective 
and/or inhumane. 
In Connecticut, however, litigation has proved a 
powerful lever for success. The filing of the Emily J. 
lawsuit in 1993 marked the beginning of the state’s 
juvenile justice reform movement, the first indication 
for many state leaders that the state’s juvenile justice 
system was seriously troubled. Ever since, litigation (or 
the threat of it) has been a key tool for augmenting the 
policy arguments advanced by advocates and for adding 
urgency to the reform impulses of leaders within the 
juvenile courts and corrections system. For instance, 
the first settlement in the Emily J. lawsuit, signed in 
1997, required the state to invest in alternatives to 
confinement – a step the state had already begun to 
implement. The second and third settlements in the 
case, signed in 2002 and 2005, also required concrete 
steps and included substantial new funding to improve 
risk assessment screening and treatment of youth with 
mental health needs, and to fund new mental health 
treatment programs.
Much credit for the deep and sustained impact of 
litigation in Connecticut can be traced to a determined 
litigator, Martha Stone, who played a central role first as 
a legal director for the Connecticut Civil Liberties Union, 
then as director of her own legal clinic, the Center for 
Children’s Advocacy at the University of Connecticut 
School of Law. In addition to documenting the system’s 
deficiencies, Stone created a constant drumbeat for 
continued reforms over 20 years, in many ways acting as 
Connecticut’s conscience. Connecticut’s policymakers 
and juvenile justice system leaders – the targets of the 
lawsuits – also deserve credit for the positive results of 
the litigation. These officials recognized that the system 
had to change, and the threat of legal sanctions helped 
them muster the political support to pass needed policy 
reforms and increase funding for effective alternatives  
to confinement. 
The settlements were hailed as beneficial by both the 
litigators and state leaders. For instance, then Attorney 
General Richard Blumenthal (now a U.S. Senator) told 
the Hartford Courant in 1997 that the first settlement 
involved “excellent changes” that were already underway 
in the state. 
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Christine Keller, until recently the state’s chief juvenile 
judge, also lauds the positive impact the state has seen 
from litigation. “No one wants to get sued,” Keller said. 
“But sometimes the best way to get money from the 
legislature for the things that need doing is to have a 
lawsuit filed.” 
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“The Connecticut story 
speaks to the power of 
partnership between 
tireless advocates 
and reform-minded 
policymakers working 
together to do right by 
youth, families, and 
communities. ”   – Katayoon Majd, Public Welfare Foundation
The filing of the emily J. lawsuit in 1993 marked the beginning  
of the state’s juvenile justice reform movement
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a ShaREd VISION aNd a COMMITMENT TO ChaNgE
Perhaps	the	single	most	important	element	in	Connecticut’s	recent	successes	has	been	a	
mutually	reinforcing	dynamic	that	has	emerged	in	the	state’s	juvenile	justice	reform	efforts,	
where	each	step	forward	serves	as	a	springboard	for	the	next.	
This	self-perpetuating	virtuous	cycle	of	reform	is	fueled	by	contributions	from	all	the	
advocates,	system	leaders	and	other	stakeholders	described	in	this	chapter.	But	it	is	held	
together	by	something	else	–	a	common	vision	that	has	emerged	in	Connecticut	for	
juvenile	justice.	
Repeatedly	in	recent	years,	Connecticut	has	convened	high-level	committees	or	task	forces	
of	legislators,	administrators,	advocates	and	parents	to	examine	top-priority	juvenile	justice	
challenges,	beginning	with	the	juvenile	justice	strategic	planning	process	that	played	such	
a	crucial	role	in	forging	statewide	consensus	for	reform.	Since	then,	the	state	has	used	this	
approach	in	creating	a	planning	and	implementation	committee	to	develop	a	proposal	
for	raising	the	age	of	juvenile	jurisdiction,	a	Family	With	Service	Needs	(FWSN)	Advisory	
Board	convened	in	2006	to	examine	policies	toward	status	offenders,	and	a	coordinating	
committee	created	in	2007	to	monitor	implementation	of	the	Raise	the	Age	legislation.	
These	workgroups	have	often	involved	the	same	people,	or	at	least	the	same	agencies,	and	
they	have	allowed	key	players	from	various	disciplines	and	arms	of	government	to	get	to	
know	each	other,	build	trust,	and	develop	a	common	understanding	and	shared	vision	of	
the	issues.
That	unified	vision,	which	guides	virtually	all	of	Connecticut’s	juvenile	justice	reform	
efforts,	revolves	around	two	key	principles:	
1.	Adolescents	are	different	than	adults	and	deserve	a	separate,	less	punitive,	and	more	
therapeutic	justice	system.
2.	The	juvenile	justice	system	often	succeeds	best	with	youth	when	it	does	the	least	–	
diverting	as	many	children	as	possible	from	arrest	and	formal	court	involvement,	keeping	
them	in	school,	and	committing	children	to	residential	custody	only	as	a	last	resort.
Two	decades	ago,	neither	of	these	principles	was	widely	accepted	in	Connecticut	outside	
of	the	advocacy	community.	Ten	years	ago,	support	for	these	principles	was	growing,	but	
the	state	lacked	programming	capacity	to	apply	them.	
Today,	the	principles	are	embraced	throughout	Connecticut’s	leadership	–	from	the	
judiciary,	to	law	enforcement,	to	juvenile	corrections	and	schools.	And	with	remarkable	
breadth	and	speed,	that	vision	is	becoming	reality.
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LESSONS: 
sTRaTegIes fROm CONNeCTICUT ThaT COUlD helP BOOsT sUCCess IN OTheR JURIsDICTIONs
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1. SEIzE ThE MOMENT 
It’s an unfortunate adage, but nonetheless true: never 
let a crisis go to waste. Time and again in Connecticut, 
advocates and reformers have seized on alarming events 
to mobilize and press for far-reaching reforms. 
In the mid-1990s, Connecticut legislators used the 
national panic over youth crime (and legitimate  
concerns about rising youth violence) as an opportunity 
to begin providing significant funding for alternatives  
to detention and incarceration. In 1998, advocates 
used the tragic suicide of a girl in the state’s Long 
Lane training school to raise awareness of problematic 
conditions and promote reforms, taking advantage of  
in-depth investigations by the state’s Child Advocate 
and Attorney General. 
Since 2000, reformers have been even more opportunistic, 
advancing the movement by responding quickly and 
decisively to emerging problems, including the following:
From 2001 through 2004, advocates seized on a stream 
of reports documenting problems with the state’s new 
training school to push for more and better alternative 
programming, as well as improved conditions within 
the facility itself. Advocates also used the scandal over 
improper contracting of the construction of the facility 
– which ultimately led to the governor’s resignation and 
imprisonment on corruption charges – to keep up the 
pressure on state leaders and advance their reform goals.
Rather than ignoring or trying to explain away the 
findings of a high-profile 2002 recidivism study showing 
that its community-based alternatives programs were 
ineffective, leaders within the Judicial Branch’s Court 
Support Services Division embraced the findings, 
terminated the programs and invested in a new 
generation of evidence-based treatment models. 
The Connecticut Juvenile Justice Alliance (Alliance) 
launched its “Raise the Age” campaign in August 2005 
– the month after a suicide of a mentally ill 17 year-old 
imprisoned at the state’s Manson Youth Institution, an 
adult prison. While the campaign had been in the works 
for some time, the suicide received prominent coverage 
in Connecticut newspapers and created substantial 
momentum for legislation that would eventually return 
16 and 17 year-olds to the juvenile system. 
2. Lay ThE gROUNdwORk 
For Connecticut’s two most sweeping and important 
juvenile justice reform laws – raising the age and 
removing status offenders from juvenile courts and 
detention centers – state leaders employed a two-stage 
process. First, the legislature established a high-level 
advisory group or task force to carefully examine the 
challenges, alternative solutions, and associated costs. 
Then, after key stakeholders and data analysts agreed 
upon detailed proposals, the legislature debated the 
measures and enacted legislation. 
This two-step process proved invaluable for two reasons: 
1. Getting the reforms right, and 
2. Bringing leaders and factions together ahead of 
time to make needed compromises and forge lasting 
consensus. 
Both reforms required complex, wide-ranging, and 
sometimes contentious changes in the state’s handling 
of youth. The two-step process enabled reformers to 
study and resolve the practical challenges associated 
with reform, and also prepare for the political objections 
these reforms were likely to encounter from opponents. 
“The task force approach has worked,” says Christine 
Rapillo, the state’s chief juvenile public defender. “It 
brought all of the key players into the room, all working 
on the assumption that this legislation is going to pass, 
so we need to get it right.” 
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Moreover, in both cases, the legislature went even one 
step further – keeping the advisory groups in place after 
the laws were enacted to monitor implementation and 
ensure success.
Every state is different when it comes to juvenile justice: different challenges, different  
economic circumstances, different system architecture, different leaders, different political 
cultures. As a result, it’s impossible to draw a straight line from Connecticut’s experience to 
reform efforts in any other state. Nonetheless, Connecticut’s success in re-engineering its 
juvenile justice system offers useful insights to leaders in other states and jurisdictions seeking  
to accomplish ambitious top-to-bottom reforms.  The following pages detail seven key lessons 
that have emerged from Connecticut’s experiences: 
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3. MakE IT REaL 
Call it the “Somebody Else’s Children” 
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 problem. 
One of the biggest challenges in building support for 
reforms in juvenile justice is getting affluent, successful, 
mostly White policymakers to feel and understand the 
importance of changing a system that primarily involves 
low income youth and families of color. To meet this 
challenge, legislators, members of the Alliance and other 
advocates have been creative in their efforts to “make it 
real” in their advocacy efforts. Facts and figures provide 
essential justification for any reform campaign. But 
ultimately, Connecticut reformers have learned that the 
human factor is critical – touching policymakers’ hearts 
and showing them what reform means in the lives of real 
children and families. 
To help policymakers make this human connection on 
juvenile justice, Connecticut advocates have employed 
several strategies:
The Alliance has worked closely with parent 
organizations and other grass-roots groups to ensure 
broad participation in rallies at the state Capitol, local 
informational breakfast meetings with legislators, and 
other events throughout the state. These occasions 
have provided youth and families the opportunity 
to introduce themselves to legislators, describe their 
experiences in and with the system, and explain why 
changes were needed.  
One of the most compelling spokespeople in the Raise 
the Age movement was Diana Gonzalez, the mother 
of the 17 year-old boy, David Burgos, who committed 
suicide while incarcerated as an adult in a Connecticut 
state prison. Speaking before the state legislature, Ms. 
Gonzalez issued a challenge that lingered in the ears and 
minds of many legislators: “What’s it going to take for 
us to make the change? Why do we wait for a tragedy? 
Why does someone like my son have to die before we 
make a change we know is right? It’s time for us to stop 
talking about making this change and do it.” 
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The Alliance also brought in compelling experts. For 
instance, in the midst of the debate over Raise the 
Age, Dr. Abigail Baird, then a Dartmouth neuroscientist, 
explained the differences between adolescent and 
adult brains to an auditorium full of legislators. Baird 
described one experiment during which adults and 
adolescents were asked whether they would be willing 
to jump into a pool filled with sharks: the adults 
all decided “no” in a fraction of a second, but most 
adolescents seriously considered diving in, and took 
several seconds to decide. According to long-time 
legislator Mike Lawlor, now the undersecretary of the 
Criminal Justice Policy and Planning Division at the state’s 
Office of Policy and Management, many of his legislative 
colleagues referred to the anecdote repeatedly in their 
discussions about Raise the Age. In a way that statistics 
never could, the vivid illustration brought home the 
reality that adolescents are different than adults (prone 
to risk-taking and impulsive behavior) and need to be 
treated differently by the justice system.
State Representative Toni Walker, co-chair of the 
Appropriations Committee and one of the legislature’s 
leading advocates for juvenile justice reform, said she was 
highly conscious of race as she tried to build legislative 
support for the Raise the Age legislation in 2007. Walker, 
who is African American, says that she selected only 
White youth and families to testify at her hearings about 
Raise the Age based on her belief that, subconsciously, 
her colleagues (who are predominantly White) would be 
better able to relate to White families’ plights.
4. adVOCaTE, BUT dON’T aLIENaTE
The Connecticut Juvenile Justice Alliance and other 
members of the state’s advocacy community have fought 
hard for their goals, displaying dogged persistence, 
but they have been careful not to employ antagonistic 
tactics. Advocates have sought to build relationships 
with those in power and win them over whenever 
possible, rather than beating system officials over the 
head and trying to make them look bad. 
“It sounds a little bit Dale Carnegie,” says Alliance 
Executive Director Abby Anderson, “but you catch more 
flies with honey.” 
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When she gets a phone call from the media about some 
new revelation or allegation of problems in the system, 
Anderson says, “my first instinct is to call the agency and 
talk with them about it” – not to issue an inflammatory 
quote to the reporter.  “If we need to be hard-nosed, we 
will,” she added, “but we want to be collaborative first.”
Martha Stone of the Center for Children’s Advocacy 
has also worked hard to build mutually respectful 
relationships with system leaders – even when she’s 
suing them over conditions of confinement or failing 
to provide youth with appropriate and timely mental 
health treatment services. 
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This ethos of collaboration has paid off in important 
ways:
Rather than devolving into acrimony and mutual 
recrimination, settlement talks for resolving the  
Emily J. lawsuit over conditions and programming in  
the state’s juvenile detention facilities served repeatedly 
as a forum for brainstorming and collaborative planning 
– and an opportunity to secure funding for programming 
that might otherwise have been unavailable to the 
Judicial Branch. With encouragement from the federal 
judge supervising the case, litigator Martha Stone and 
officials from the Court Support Services Division  
(CSSD) and other state agencies negotiated a 
detailed five-year reform plan in 1997 that both 
sides supported. Then, when progress on improving 
mental health treatment and alternative programming 
failed to materialize, the two sides returned to the 
bargaining table in 2002 and reached another mutually 
advantageous agreement. 
This collaborative spirit was also evident – and 
beneficial – in the work of the two committees created 
by Connecticut’s legislature in 2006 and tasked with 
forging plans for raising the age and reforming the  
state’s treatment and handling of status offenses.  
Both groups included committed leaders with widely 
diverging perspectives – judges, prosecutors, defenders, 
staff from the Department of Children and Families 
(DCF) and CSSD, as well as advocates.  And both groups 
were responsible for creating plans that required 
potentially divisive policy choices on a range of intricate 
and complex issues. Yet, rather than allow philosophical 
or bureaucratic differences to derail progress, both 
groups forged consensus on plans that adhered to  
best practice research and required compromise from  
all sides. 
The 2004-2006 statewide juvenile justice strategic 
planning process owed its success to a similar 
commitment to collaboration.  Initially suggested by the 
Connecticut Juvenile Justice Alliance, the process was 
overseen jointly by CSSD and DCF, with funding from the 
state legislature and assistance from the Child Welfare 
League of America, and it involved a diverse group of 
stakeholders from around the state.
5. FOLLOw ThE EVIdENCE
In Connecticut, system leaders have committed to track 
and heed the evidence, even if it requires dramatic 
changes. As detailed previously, Connecticut has 
fundamentally re-oriented its juvenile programs and 
services over the past decade to align its efforts with 
new research about what works and to carefully track 
results and adjust its approaches based on outcome 
data. 
Ever since the adolescent substance abuse unit within 
DCF established the state’s first Multisystemic Therapy 
program in 1997, the state has made an enormous 
investment in evidence-based treatment models 
for troubled and delinquent youth. Today, programs 
operated by DCF and CSSD together serve more than 
5,000 youths per year.   DCF has also incorporated 
evidence-based best practices into a number of other 
aspects of its work with juvenile offenders, including 
assessment and treatment of youth in the training 
school; trauma-informed treatment and other best 
practices for court-involved girls; and adoption of 
evidence-based aftercare service models for youth 
returning home from residential placement. 
The state’s Juvenile Justice Strategic Plan, completed 
in 2006, created a number of concrete outcome goals 
and adopted “Results-Based Accountability” to monitor 
progress. This process continues to keep state leaders 
focused on critical outcomes and forces them to 
identify and address obstacles to success.  
This focus on outcomes and commitment to maximizing 
results has been especially evident in CSSD, which 
scrapped its early ineffective programs and went back to 
the drawing board, importing models with the strongest 
evidence of effectiveness and replicating them widely 
throughout the state. And when research made clear that 
removing youth who had committed minor offenses from 
their homes increased recidivism and wasted taxpayers’ 
money, CSSD created a new objective screening grid that 
prohibits commitments of low-risk youth. CSSD also 
instituted new practices requiring a supervisor’s approval 
before probation officers can order a youth taken into 
custody and began rejecting school-based referrals of 
cases that do not involve serious law-breaking. 
Today, more than 5,000 youths per year are served by 
non-residential evidence-based programs operated by DCf and CssD 
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National experts and leaders within the state cite 
CSSD’s highly developed data capabilities as a rare and 
invaluable asset. 
“Connecticut, and CSSD in particular, has a very, very 
strong data system, and they’re willing to produce the 
data we ask for,” reports Jason Szanyi, a staff attorney 
at the Center for Children’s Law and Policy (CCLP) in 
Washington, D.C. who has been working with local teams 
in Bridgeport and Hartford to combat racial disparities.
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Noting that CCLP has conducted similar work in 17 
jurisdictions nationwide, Szanyi’s colleague Tiana Davis 
adds that “ours is a data-driven process. Connecticut’s 
capacity with data … [has made it] much better prepared 
than a lot of jurisdictions that we’ve worked with.” 
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CSSD Executive Director William Carbone agrees 
that data is vital. “How can you set goals for change 
if you don’t understand the characteristics of your 
population?” asks Carbone, noting that CSSD’s 
management information system now allows managers 
to track outcomes and trends in minute detail. “If you 
have no data, how do you measure anything?” 
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6. ENgagE NaTIONaL ExpERTS… aNd            
    LOCaL ONES, TOO 
NaTIONal eXPeRTs 
Even with the impressive expertise and resources 
available within the state, Connecticut leaders have not 
hesitated to reach out for help from national experts 
and resources. 
Connecticut’s Raise the Age effort relied heavily on 
the support of the Campaign for Youth Justice and its 
president, Liz Ryan. At the height of the Raise the Age 
debates in 2006 and 2007, Ryan was a frequent fixture in 
the state, intimately involved in helping the Connecticut 
Juvenile Justice Alliance plan and coordinate its 
advocacy efforts. The National Juvenile Justice Network 
in Washington, D.C., a coalition of state-based advocacy 
groups such as the Alliance, also provided valuable support. 
Prior to that, the planning committee that developed 
the Raise the Age statute called upon three national 
organizations – the Vera Institute of Justice, the 
National Center for State Courts, and the criminal 
justice consulting firm Hornby Zeller Associates to 
help determine the proper mix of services required to 
serve older youth, the implications for courts and court 
dockets, and other logistical details. 
To facilitate the state’s juvenile justice strategic planning 
process in 2004 to 2006, Connecticut secured the help 
of experts from the Child Welfare League of America. 
Connecticut has sought out top national experts on a 
range of other issues as well, including child welfare and 
juvenile justice expert Dr. Marty Beyer to examine the 
needs of girls in Connecticut’s juvenile justice system; 
Judges Steven Teske (Clayton County, GA) and Brian 
Huff (Jefferson County, AL) to advise on reducing school 
arrests; Joseph Cocozza (National Center for Mental 
Health and Juvenile Justice) regarding mental health 
issues; Mark Soler (Center for Children’s Law and Policy) 
to support local projects to reduce racial disparities; 
Ned Loughran (Council of Juvenile Correctional 
Administrators) to improve care and prevent 
maltreatment at the state training school; Dr. Thomas 
Grisso (National Youth Screening and Assessment 
Project) to help develop procedures for assessing the 
mental health status of court-involved youth; and Shay 
Bilchik (Georgetown University’s Center for Juvenile 
Justice Reform) to advise on integration of evidence-
based programs and practices, among others.
lOCal eXPeRTIse 
At the same time, state officials in Connecticut are 
increasingly partnering with community leaders who can 
provide on-the-ground feedback whether state programs 
are working. In Bridgeport, the Regional Youth Adult 
Social Action Partnership (RYASAP) has played a valuable 
role since 2000 by bringing local leaders together and 
focusing attention on gaps and problems that are not 
well understood at the state level. 
Since 2010, the 13 Local Interagency Service Teams (LISTs), 
most operated by members of the Connecticut Youth 
Services Association, have played a similarly valuable 
role across the state. Conceived during the state’s 
juvenile justice strategic planning process and based on 
the RYASAP model, the LISTs provide valuable feedback 
to the state on juvenile justice issues in the local 
communities. They receive no funding, but have the ear 
of state leaders, so the meetings are widely attended in 
many communities, and they are generating substantial 
new energy toward building awareness and crafting 
creative solutions to lingering local youth problems. 
available data leave no doubt that public safety has improved as a 
result of Connecticut’s juvenile justice reforms
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Some examples:
LISTs are spearheading pilot projects in Bridgeport and 
Hartford to combat racial disparities in juvenile justice – 
poring over data to identify decision points where  
youth of color are being targeted disproportionately,  
and working with local police, schools, and court officials 
to brainstorm solutions. These pilots will be replicated in 
2013 in Waterbury and New Haven with the assistance  
of the Washington, DC-based Center for Children’s Law 
and Policy.
LISTs in other jurisdictions have been active in new 
efforts to reduce school suspensions and arrests – 
helping to bring attention to the issue, engage officials 
in local school districts and police departments, and, 
in a growing number of jurisdictions, iron out formal 
agreements between schools and police limiting the 
circumstances under which students may be arrested  
at school.  
By convening community breakfasts and other events 
to discuss local issues, the LISTs are helping to uncover 
problems and concerns over how well state policies 
and programs are working on the ground. In Danbury, 
for instance, the local LIST got word that, due to an 
anomaly in the state’s domestic violence statutes, two 
brothers (ages 11 and 13) were threatened with domestic 
battery charges for getting into a fight with each other. 
Through the LIST, the case was brought to the attention 
of advocates in Hartford, who successfully encouraged 
legislators to tweak the law to ensure that children 
could not be prosecuted in court for normal childhood 
behavior. “In the past, there would be no forum for 
someone to raise a concern like this,” according to Abby 
Anderson of the Connecticut Juvenile Justice Alliance, 
“or for anyone to hear them.” 
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In addition, Anderson notes that the LISTs have provided 
the Connecticut Juvenile Justice Alliance with an 
additional avenue to keep supporters informed about 
pending legislation and other developments – and 
another way to identify individuals across the state  
who might provide compelling testimony to the 
legislature. For instance, Anderson credits the LISTS 
with a valuable assist in winning legislative support in 
2010 to fund Family Support Centers and comparable 
programming to serve status offenders statewide. 
Until then, these centers – designed to provide status 
offenders with individual and family counseling, 
mediation and other services – were active only in  
four of the state’s largest cities. 
7. COMMIT FOR ThE LONg haUL
Connecticut has learned that the challenges to reform 
never end. There is always more to do. Creating and 
maintaining a first-rate juvenile justice system requires a 
continuing thirst for improvement and innovation.
Even with all that Connecticut’s juvenile justice 
reformers have accomplished in recent years, their 
efforts are not slowing down. If anything, they are 
accelerating, with ambitious initiatives to address 
racial disparities, school arrests, and the issues of 
youth who are dually involved in the child welfare and 
juvenile justice  systems. The state is also ramping up 
its investments in mentoring, restorative justice and 
age-appropriate services for older youth, including job 
training, college access and supervised housing.  
The Connecticut Juvenile Justice Alliance and Keep 
the Promise Children’s Committee, a new statewide 
coalition around children’s mental health, continue to 
meet monthly and attract new members committed 
to identifying and advocating policy and practice 
changes that benefit youth and families.  The Court 
Support Services Division has rejuvenated its Center for 
Best Practices to keep abreast of new research around 
juvenile justice reform and, among other things, has 
adopted  and trained probation officers in a graduated 
behavior response system that also rewards good 
behavior.  The Department of Children and Families has 
integrated parole into its child welfare and behavioral 
health systems, increasing services for youth in aftercare, 
and it is planning soon to make major renovations to 
improve the training school and open a new facility for 
girls that will serve as a bridge between the one state-
funded secure (locked) facility for girls and the state’s 
network of more open group homes and residential 
treatment centers. In addition, both state agencies have 
committed to increasing family engagement.
At the federal level, Connecticut’s two U.S. Senators, 
Richard Blumenthal and Chris Murphy, have prioritized 
juvenile justice reform and violence prevention.
“I’ve always believed that while standing up for kids 
in the juvenile justice system isn’t always politically 
popular, it’s incredibly important,” says Murphy. 
“Connecticut should be proud of its unyielding 
commitment to improving the system to keep our most 
vulnerable youth safe and give them a second chance. 
By taking bold steps that put kids and evidenced-based 
policies first, Connecticut has become a nationwide 
model for reform.
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